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Changes to the military retirement system in the 1980's and attention by law
makers, military leadership, and service members to pay comparability between the
private sector and the military indicate that current military compensation policies may be
inadequate to recruit and retain the necessary personnel. This thesis examines the
military retirement system in light of developments in private sector retirement policy. It
also examines the pay structure used in the military and addresses current pay gap issues.
Defined contribution plans in the private sector have been increasingly successful in
public and government organizations. Examples include the Federal Employees Thrift
Savings Plan and Section 403 (b), Section 457, and Section 414(h)(2) tax-deferred
retirement plans. These plans benefit employees in retirement by providing them with
tax incentives to encouraging saving during their working years. The recent introduction
of the Roth IRA provides individuals a new opportunity to save for retirement years. The
success of the U.S stock market since the 1970's indicates that saving through a defined
contribution plan or IRA may provide income security for retirement years. It is
concluded that the current military retirement system may have to be modified to reflect
these developments in the private sector. Prospects for reform include some form of
defined contribution plan for military members, eliminating or reducing the perceived
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The concept of paying workers according to their contribution and performance
has long been the cornerstone of the American free enterprise system. For most
Americans in the labor force, wages are determined by the rules of the marketplace.
However, unlike those pay systems used in the civilian sector, the military compensation
system relies on the principles of rank, seniority, and time in service. Though the
military compensation package consists of different pay, allowance and benefit programs,
this study will focus mainly on basic pay and military retirement compensation.
Specifically, this study will focus on whether the current military compensation system is
sufficient to achieve force structure requirements in the future. It will address whether
changes to the current system could provide savings to the Department of Defense, while
providing military members the long-term security required to achieve force structure
requirements in an all volunteer force.
A competitive wage system for the military has been and remains a critical issue
in the retention of personnel. Military advocates argue that members of the services
should receive pay that is comparable with the private sector. They note that 1 982 was
the last year in which military and civilian sector pay was comparable. They attribute
this gap to insufficient funding to maintain cost of living adjustments since the early
1980's. [Ref. 1, p. 1]
In 1993, in an effort to reduce overall defense expenditures, the Clinton
Administration proposed a series of caps on military pay increases. This action came
after an almost 12 percent gap in wage growth had developed between 1982 and 1992,
using the Bureau of Labor Statistics Employment Cost Index (ECI). [Ref. 2, p. 1] The
ECI is the index currently used in setting military pay increases. With the exception of
pay raises in 1981 and 1982, Congress has capped military pay raises since 1977 such
that the cumulative gap now exceeds 13 percent. The fiscal year 1998 Department of
Defense (DoD) Authorization Act included a 2.8 percent pay increase, effective on
January 1, 1998. [Ref. 1, p. 1] It links military pay raises directly to the average of
private sector wage increases using the Employment Cost Index (ECI). This increase
indicates that legislators recognize the need for parity between military and private sector
pay.
In 1947, Congress implemented a common military retirement system for both
officers and enlisted personnel. The purpose of the military retirement system has been
to attract and retain high quality personnel to serve in the armed forces. The retirement
benefits package, available upon retirement and for life to those who qualify, is funded
entirely by the government. It has been the foundation of the All-Volunteer Force. For
members, retirement benefits have been the reward for extraordinary demands during the
course of their careers. Starting on October 1, 1984, Public Law 98-92 established a
normal cost funding method for the military retirement system called the military
retirement fund (MRF). Under the law, the Department of Defense pays the normal cost
of the MRF and the Treasury Department makes payments from revenues for the
unfunded liability. [Ref. 3, p. 1]
The dwindling value of military pay and recent reforms in retirement
compensation have diminished the value of retired pay significantly. Modifications were
-"£_- made to the original retirement system in 1981 and 1986 in an effort to reduce the cost of
retirement while maintaining force structure and morale. This has resulted in the
Department of Defense having three annuity-based retirement systems, eligibility for
which is determined by when a member joined.
In the last 25 years, almost all changes affecting military retirement have been
targeted at reducing benefits to cut the cost to the government. Many influential
legislators believe that additional cutbacks are warranted. These arguments are
sometimes linked to the notion that the military should move to restructure its retirement "
system to resemble the systems now used in many major corporations. These critics
argue that individual investments in Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA's), Thrift
Savings Plans (TSP's), or 40 IK plans would provide military members with the same
benefits that civilian plans provide, while simultaneously allowing for some savings to
the government.
Military advocates and leaders argue that this would negatively affect the
Services' ability to recruit and retain the required numbers of high quality personnel for a
full career. They argue that the military cannot hire technically qualified personnel from
the private sector for necessary technical sub-specialties. Also, the military cannot recruit
top managers or commanders from the civilian sector. Instead, these individuals must be
developed from the bottom of the hierarchical structure and promoted to upper ranks
based on performance. This lack of lateral entry results from the specific nature of
military life and the requirement for skills that are not available in the civilian sector.
This feature of the military personnel system recognizes that the capacity to perform at
higher levels is dependent on experience and training in lower ranking positions. [Ref. 3,
p. 178]
Military members entering service prior to 1980 are eligible for retirement
benefits under the Final Pay system. Members entering between 1980 and 1986 are
eligible to retire under the High Three retirement system. Preliminary studies by RAND
have indicated that the forty-percent retirement system enacted by the Military
Retirement Reform Act (REDUX) of 1986 is not sufficient to convince service members
joining after 1986 to remain in the services for twenty years. In fact, it predicts that
REDUX will reduce the probability that an enlisted entrant will stay for 20 years from
10.7 percent to 8.6 percent, a decline of approximately 20 percent. The same model
predicts that officers would be approximately 10 percent less likely to stay in for 20
years. However, the RAND model estimates that the retention effect could be offset
through incremental pay raises based on the personal discount rate. The personal discount
rate is the value that individuals place on receiving benefits now. It reflects the time
value of money by implying that benefits are worth more if they are experienced sooner
because of the cost of capital. The RAND study assumed a discount rate of 10 percent.
[Ref.4,p. 41]
The awareness of compensation issues by service members is an important
consideration for military leaders. Leaders understand that these compensation systems
weigh heavily on individual decisions to stay in or leave the service. If the military were
to adopt private contributory retirement packages similar to those found in large U.S.
companies, senior military leaders may have to consider financial planning programs
similar to those that have been used in corporate America.
Currently, there are only a few programs within the Department of Defense
designed to assist service members with financial planning. The two most visible
programs available in the Navy are the Transition Assistance Management Program
(TAMP) and the Personal Financial Management (PFM) Program.
TAMP is a DoD-wide initiative designed to assist service members with transition
from military to civilian life. It includes the Transition Assistance Program (TAP),
designed to address social, financial and professional issues associated with the transition
from the military to civilian life.
Many military personnel experience significant personal debt, financial hardship,
or lack of knowledge regarding investment and saving decisions. To ease these burdens
the Navy has developed the PFM Program to meet the needs of all Navy members. For
the most part however, this program is only aimed at helping individual members who
are in need. If military members become more responsible for their own retirement
investment decisions, for example through a 40 1 k program, it is likely that current
programs would not be sufficient to provide all members with guidance and instruction.
B. OBJECTIVES
The objective of the thesis is to examine the current military compensation
system, focusing on current military retirement packages. Additionally, retirement trends
in the private sector will be examined. The thesis will provide an assessment of military
retirement reform proposals associated with decreasing resources in the Department of
Defense and changes in civilian retirement policies.
C. RESEARCH QUESTION
The primary research question is: Could changes to the current military
compensation system provide savings to the Department of Defense, while providing
military members the long-term security required to achieve force structure requirements
in an all volunteer force?
Secondary questions include the following:
• Should the current military retirement system be changed to reflect retirement
trends in the private sector and in the federal civilian retirement system?
• Is the current military pay structure competitive with private sector
compensation packages?
• What is the role of financial planning programs within the branches of the
Department of Defense to inform service members on retirement and investment
decisions?
• Is this role in need of reengineering in light of changes in the structure of
financial incentives and options facing service members?
• Do "civilian style" retirement proposals undermine military retirement
justification?
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This thesis reviews the current military retirement system including the military
retirement fund and summarizes trends in private sector retirement funding. It also
examines the current pay structure used in DoD and compares it with equivalent civilian
paying jobs. It addresses new retirement opportunities that have resulted from recent tax
law changes, and how military members might benefit. Additionally, it reviews the
Personal Financial Management (PFM) Programs available to military members to asses
their ability to support a contributory retirement system. Specifically, it addresses
whether current programs are sufficient to provide all members with adequate guidance
and instruction if members become responsible for more of their own retirement
decisions. Finally, it indicates how changes to these systems would impact force
structure and retention and whether additional savings could be achieved.
E. METHODOLOGY
Data for this thesis was obtained through a comprehensive search of government
publications, books, periodicals and Internet sources. Emphasis was on General "—-\
Accounting Office reports, Employment Benefit Research Institute publications,
Department of Defense Office of the Actuary reports, and publications of nonprofit /
institutions involved in improving policy and decision making in the Department of
Defense. Comparisons were made between current military compensation and non-
military retirement and pay trends. The majority of information on non-military
compensation was gathered from articles, publications, and internet sources explaining
savings and investment decisions with regard to civilian style retirement plans. Recent
publications and reports on the Federal Employee Retirement System were examined to
identify relevant features that could be implemented in a military compensation package.
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
The thesis is divided into seven chapters arranged as follows:
I. Introduction
II. The Military Pay System
This chapter presents an overview ofhow the present day pay scale has evolved
from the military pay system. It describes the elements of and reasons for the current
military pay system, and establishes the argument that regular military compensation
(RMC) should be competitive with equivalent civilian packages. This chapter presents
the major problems with the present pay system which include:
1.) The lack of incentive within the structure of the pay table.
2.) Differences among services and within fields or rates within a service.
3.) The increasing pay gap between civilian and military personnel.
Additionally, this chapter addresses the complexity and ineffectiveness of the current
system of bonus and incentive pays.
III. The Military Retirement System
This chapter describes the three retirement plans that are currently funded by the
Department of Defense, briefly reviewing the history of all three systems and the reasons
for changes in each system. Also, it addresses the funding of the Military Retirement
Fund and how Congress attempts to reduce military retirement compensation to achieve
deficit reduction. It identifies the reasons for the current retirement system and provide
insight into current and anticipated problems within the system.
IV. Pay and Retirement Trends in the Civilian Sector
The different retirement plans used in the private sector and the Federal Employee
Retirement System are examined in this chapter. Corporate and public sector employers
typically offer workers a defined benefit pension plan based on pay, years of service, and
other factors, and a defined contribution plan which makes regular payments to
participants* individual accounts, coming from the employer and/or employee, or plans
including both plan types. This portion of the thesis examines the advantages and dis-
advantages of both defined benefit and defined contribution plans.
V. New Opportunities for Individual Retirement Investing
Documented success of the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) component of the Federal
Employment Retirement System (FERS) has encouraged lawmakers to seek additional
means to provide for retirement benefits for military retirees, while also cutting
entitlement spending. Some suggested alternatives include a TSP for the military, 401(k)
or 403 (k) plans similar to those used in private industry, and/or traditional or Roth
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA's). Of course, each option has advantages and
disadvantages with regard to cost savings, taxable revenue, and retirement age
considerations. Individual preferences among military leaders, lobbyist groups, and the
Congress fuel the debate as to which plan(s) would be best.
For individual service members, these decisions affect such areas as taxable
income, retirement planning, and career decision making. New tax laws have caused
most tax paying citizens, both military and civilian, to re-examine their individual
retirement plans for greater future returns.
Finally, this chapter examines the potential consequences of using the above
alternative and or supplemental retirement vehicles with respect to improving recruiting
and retention within DoD. Recent remarks by service chiefs and congressional members
have identified decreased retirement benefits as probable reasons for lower than average
retention within the services.
VI. Financial Planning Programs Within DOD
This chapter focuses on current personal financial management programs within
the Department of Defense. It identifies and evaluates financial management services
currently offered to military personnel and their dependents.
VII. Conclusions and Recommendations
In light of what has been discussed in chapters one through six, the final chapter
discusses possible adjustments to military pay and retirement compensation to reflect
trends in FERS and the private sector. It provides recommendations for changes to
portions of the current military compensation system to provide a system of
compensation based on equality, experience, and level of responsibility. It examines the
effects of such adjustments on force structure and recommends solutions to current and
prospective problems inherent in the military compensation system.
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II. THE MILITARY PAY SYSTEM
A. INTRODUCTION
Unlike pay systems that govern most civilian workers in the private sector, the
armed forces use a system based on rank and seniority. Where civilian pay is based
mostly on work quantity and performance, military pay is structured on a system geared
largely to meeting the needs of the services. The military compensation system consists
of an assortment of basic pay, allowances, and benefits. By convention, military pay is
broken into four categories: regular military compensation including housing allowances,
subsistence allowances, special pays, and fringe benefits. They are commonly referred to
as basic pay, quarters and subsistence allowances, bonuses or incentives, and tax
advantages.
B. MILITARY PAY SYSTEM COMPONENTS
1. Basic Pay
The largest, most visible component of the military compensation system is basic
pay. It is the cash element of military compensation, to which every service member is
entitled. Like a civilian salary, it is considered to be compensation for work performed,
hours worked, or level of responsibility. Its purpose is to attract and retain high-quality
people with the right skills to support national defense objectives. Military basic pay is
based on rank and accumulated years of service. [Ref. 5, p. 22] The January 1. 1998
version of the military basic pay rates, originally established in 1949 on
recommendations of the Hook Commission, are shown in Table 2-1.
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Table 2-1
1998 Military Basic Pay Table (Monthly)



















S 7.566 S 7.832 S 7.832 S 7.832 S 7,832 S 8.133 S 8.133 S 8.584 S 8.584 S 9.198 S 9.198 S 9.814 S 9.814 S 9.814 S 10,425
S 6 "06 S 5.881 S 7.028 S 7.028 S 7.028 S 7.207 S 7.207 S 7,507 S 7.507 S 8.133 S 8.133 S 8.584 S 8.584 S 8 584 S 9.198
S 6.074 S 6.256 S 6,404 S 6.404 S 6.404 S 6.881 S 6.881 $ 7.207 $ 7.207 $ 7.507 S 7 832 S 8.133 S 8,334 S 8.334 S 8.334
S 5.047 S 5.390 S 5.390 S 5.390 S 5.632 S 5.632 S 5.958 S 5.958 5 6.256 S 6.881 S 7.355 S 7.355 S 7,355 S 7,355 S 7,355
S 3 T40 S 4.109 S' 4.379 S 4.379 S 4.379 S 4,379 S 4.379 S 4.379 S 4,528 S 5,244 S 5.511 S 5.632 S 5.958 S 6.159 S 6.462
S 2.992 S 3.513 S 3,756 S 3.756 S 3.756 S 3.756 $ 3,869 S 4,078 S 4.351 S 4.677 S 4.944 S 5.095 S 5.273 S 5.273 S 5.273
S 2 522 S 3.071 S 3.275 S 3.275 S 3.336 S 3.483 S 3.721 S 3.930 S 4.109 S 4,290 S 4,408 S 4.408 S 4.408 S 4.408 S 4.408
S 2.343 S 2.620 S 2.801 $ 3.099 S 3.248 S 3.364 $ 3.546 S 3.721 5 3,812 S 3.812 S 3.812 S 3.812 S 3.812 S 3.812 S 3.812
S 2.044 S 2.232 S 2.681 5 2.771 S 2.829 S 2.829 S 2.829 S 2.829 S 2.829 S 2.829 S 2.829 S 2.829 S 2.829 S 2.829 5 2.329
S 1.774 S 1.847 S 2.232 S 2.232 S 2.232 $ 2.232 S 2.232 S 2.232 S 2.232 S 2.232 S 2.232 S 2.232 S 2.232 S 2.232 S 2.232
S 3.099 S 3,248 S 3.364 S 3.546 S 3.721 S 3,869 S 3.869 S 3.869 S 3.869 S 3.869 S 3.869 S 3.869
S 2.771 S 2.829 S 2.918 $ 3.071 S 3.188 S 3.275 S 3.275 S 3.275 S 3.275 S 3.275 S 3.275 S 3.275
5 2.232 S 2.384 S 2.472 S 2.562 S 2.651 S 2.771 S 2.771 S 2.771 S 2.771 S 2.771 S 2.771 5 2.771
S 4.075 S 4.229 S 4.351 S 4.535
S 2.387 S 2.562 S 2.562 S 2.620 S 2.739 S 2.860 S 2,980 $ 3.188 5 3.336 S 3.454 S 3 546 S 3.660 S 3.783 S 3.901 S 4.078
S 2.170 S 2.354 S 2.354 S 2.384 S 2.412 S 2.588 S 2,739 S 2,829 S 2.918 S 3,006 S 3,099 S 3,220 S 3.336 S 3.336 S 3.454
S 1.901 S 2.056 S 2.056 S 2.116 S 2,232 S 2,354 S 2.443 $ 2,533 S 2.620 S 2.712 S 2.801 S 2.889 S 3.006 S 3,006 S 3,006
S 1.583 S 1.815 S 1.815 S 1.967 S 2.056 S 2.144 S 2.232 S 2,324 S 2.412 S 2,502 S 2,588 S 2.681 S 2 681 S 2.681 S 2,681
VUS I <5 2 3 Z B El TO TO TO TO TO 2TT
szm
S 2.777 S 2,840 S 2,904 S 2.971 S 3.038 S 3,096 S 3.259 S 3.386 S 3.576
S 2.329 S 2.396 S 2.459 S 2.523 S 2.590 S 2.648 S 2,714 S 2.873 S 3.001 S 3.194
S 1.625 S 1.756 S 1.820 S 1.884 $ 1,949 S 2.011 S 2.075 S 2,140 S 2.236 S 2.300 S 2.363 S 2,394 S 2.555 S 2.582 S 2.873
S 1.399 S 1.525 S 1.588 $ 1.656 S 1.718 S 1.780 S 1.845 S 1.940 S 2.001 S 2,066 S 2,097 S 2.097 S 2.097 S 2,097 S 2 097
S 1.228 S 1.336 S 1,401 S 1.462 $ 1.558 $ 1.622 S 1.686 S 1.748 S 1.780 S 1.780 S 1,780 S 1.780 S 1.780 S 1.780 S 1.780
S 1,145 S 1.209 S 1.280 S 1.379 S 1.434 S 1.434 S 1.434 S 1.434 S 1.434 S 1,434 S 1 434 S 1.434 S 1.434 S 1.434 S 1434
S 1.079 S 1.138 S 1.183 S 1.230 S 1,230 S 1,230 $ 1.230 S 1.230 S 1.230 S 1.230 S 1.230 S 1.230 S 1.230 S 1.230 S 1.230
S 1.038 S 1.038 S 1.038 S 1,038 S 1.038 S 1.038 S 1.038 S 1.038 S 1.038 S 1.038 S 1,038 S 1.038 S 1038 S 1 038 S 1.038
S 926 S 926 S 926 S 926 S 926 S 926 S 926 S 926 S 926 S 926 S 926 S 926 S 926 S 926 S 926
Source: Defense Finance and Accounting Service.
2. Subsistence and Quarters Allowances
In addition to receiving basic pay, armed service members have traditionally been
provided with meals and quarters. If facilities for quarters are not available or individual
members elect not to occupy available housing, cash allowances are paid to defray the
expenses of "living on the economy". Because subsistence and quarters allowances are
not subject to federal income tax, military personnel realize a considerable tax advantage.
The magnitude of this tax saving depends, of course, on the size of the allowance, total
taxable income, and dependency status.
3. Special Pays
Military personnel may be eligible for special pay. These benefits are used to
attract personnel who have particular expertise, to encourage retention of individuals with
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certain skills, or as compensation for unusually risky jobs. Special pay is not unique to
military' personnel. Civilian companies often pay more to overseas employees or those
involved in risky jobs. Additionally, they pay more to attract and retain valuable
personnel. In 1992, 57 types of special payments were provided to 43 percent of the
force and constituted five percent of the total military' payroll. [Ref. 5, p. 19] Special and
Incentive Pays are shown in Table 2-2.
Table 2-2
7
th QRMC Classification of Hazardous Duty and Incentive Pays









Toxic Pesticide, Virus, or Bacteria Exposure
Handling Toxic Fuels, Propellants, or Chemicals












Flight Pay (Crew Member)
Aviation Career Incentive Pay





Enlisted Member Extending Overseas
Enlisted Member Assigned to High Priority Unit
Submarine Duty
Foreign Language Proficiency
Medical Officers Board Certification Pay
Medical Officers Variable Special Pay
Dental Officers Board Certification Pay
Dental Officers Variable Special Pay




















Non-physician Health Care Providers
Veterinarians
Reserve Medical Officers Special Pay
While on Duty at Certain Places
Officers Holding Positions of Unusual
Responsibility








Skill Incentive Selective Reenlistment Bonus
Reenlistment Bonus-Ready Reserve
Reenlistment Bonus-Selected reserve
Nuclear Qualified Enlisted Members
Nurse Anesthetics
Optometrists Retention Special Pay
Aviation Career Officers Extending Active Duty
Engineering and Science Career Continuation
Acquisition Corps Continuation Bonus
Medical Officers Multiyear Retention Bonus
Medical Officers Incentive Special Pay
Nuclear Qualified Officers Extending Active Duty
Nuclear Career Annual Incentive Bonus
Dental Officers Additional Special pay
Medical Officers Additional Special Pay
Enlistment Bonus
Army Enlistment Bonus
Bonus for Reserve Affiliation
Enlistment Bonus-Ready Reserve
Enlistment Bonus-Selected Reserve
Prior Service Enlistment Bonus
Accession Bonus for Registered Nurses
























Source: Report of the Seventh Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation,
Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1992.
Associated with these compensation requirements are complex, implementing
policies and procedures. Some pay rates are fixed at specific dollar amounts; others are
capped. Some are paid monthly, some annually, others as bonuses. Changes to these
pays or instituting new entitlements can be a lengthy process because they must be
-*£ included in the Planning, Programming, and Budget System (PPBS). The time from
identifying a requirement for modification to authorization can be up to three years.
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Among the problems associated with this 36-month process are that it does not capture
when and how the process should be initiated. Also, pay reviews do not occur as
scheduled and some pays are neglected for long periods of time ranging from 6 to 10
years. [Ref. 5, p. 100]
4. Other Allowances and Pays
Members of the military are also eligible for allowances intended to off-set
special job-related expenses. These include allowances for uniform items, family
separation pay, and dislocation allowances. Also, in areas where the cost of living is
deemed excessive, personnel are entitled to additional allowances to defray some
expenses.
C. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BASIC PAY, BASIC MILITARY
COMPENSATION, AND REGULAR MILITARY COMPENSATION
The combination of basic pay, allowances, and the tax advantage constitute basic
military compensation (BMC). Basic pay is not representative, for comparative purposes,
of salaries in the private sector. However, comparisons can be made between basic
military compensation or regular military compensation (RMC) and private sector
salaries. RMC is equal to BMC plus the average variable housing allowances (VHA) and W
the additional tax savings VHA provides, since these allowances are not subject to federal
tax. Regular Military Compensation (RMC) has been regarded as the basis for
comparing military and civilian pay and for calculating pay increases since 1965.
Although it has not been used as an official measure since 1974, RMC is still widely
regarded as the equivalent of a civilian salary. [Ref. 6, p. A-7]
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Basic pay is the only element of military pay upon which retired pay is calculated.
Basic pay represents approximately 72 percent ofRMC for active duty personnel.
Therefore, a 20-year retiree may be eligible for 50 percent of basic pay but only 35
percent of RMC. For 30-year retirees the member is entitled to 75 percent of basic pay
but only 56 percent of RMC. These relationships are important in comparing military
retired pay to other public or private pension plans. [Ref. 6, p. A-7] The relationship
between basic pay and retirement pay will be discussed further in chapter III.
Because military compensation covers such a large variety of issues and policies,
this study will not address all aspects of the system. Instead, it will focus on the
comparison between basic military and private sector civilian pay, as it constitutes the
major portion of Regular Military Compensation (RMC), and is most directly involved in
considerations affecting retirement pay.
D. SETTING MILITARY PAY
Prior to 1967, adjustments to military pay were not regular. Separate legislation
was needed for each change in basic pay, allowances, or benefits. Increases were usually
the result of intense lobbying or increased international tensions. Ten increases in basic
pay were approved between the end of World War II and 1967. Of the ten increases in
basic pay, four were across the board raises, while the six other increases excluded
personnel who had served less than two years. In 1967 "comparability" was introduced
into the military pay system. It was designed to provide a means to establish comparable
pay rates between military personnel and their civilian counterparts in the private sector.
Because of differences between the two pay systems, a special formula was used to
convert civilian pay increases into equal increases for military personnel. Later, the
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formula was revised to account for increased cash allowances for quarters and
subsistence. [Ref. 6, p. 19]
While the military pay system differs in many respects from civilian systems, the
two most prominent differences are:
1) The military pays members principally on rank and years of service while
civilians emphasize skill level and occupation and link pay directly to work
performance.
2) The military provides basic necessities for food, clothing, shelter, and medical
care to all members.
Historically, cash allowances are a relatively new concept to the military pay
system. Prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, special pay. allowances, and bonus
and incentive pay were extremely rare. Basic pay constituted the majority of earnings,
while food, uniforms, and accommodations were provided to forces that were
predominantly single. There was little emphasis on comparing military pay with civilian
pay since most jobs in the military had no civilian counterpart.
Additionally, the composition of the forces was different than it is today.
Infantrymen and able-bodied seamen made up the majority of the armed services. The
hierarchical structure placed emphasis on rank and seniority instead ofjob skills and
proficiency. The reasons for the compensation system were imbedded in the belief that
the armed forces were an institution and not an occupation.
The institutional concept seemed reasonable since authority and relationships
between superior and subordinate resembled those of disciplined and hierarchical
organizations. The major function of the military personnel system required that all
17
individuals respond immediately and without question; it demanded a discipline not
generally associated with civilian occupations. The principle implied that the military
establishment placed individuals at the disposal of the institution. The senior personnel
in the hierarchy decided what jobs got done, how and when they got done, and who did
them without consultation with junior personnel.
The need to motivate individuals to make such a commitment and to foster a
sense of dedication considered critical to military effectiveness have long been a concern
of senior leadership. Traditionally, money has not been the only incentive; military
sendee, patriotism, and moral indebtedness have been used to create a professional
identity in which cohesion, unity of purpose and loyalty are emphasized.
To promote this principle of unity and cohesion, the characteristics that
distinguish the military from non-military life have long been emphasized. It should not
be surprising then, that the military pay system was structured to reflect those principles.
Implicit in this institutional setting is the notion that all members of the same rank who
have served the same number of years are making equal contributions to the national
defense of the country.
E. PROBLEMS WITH BASIC PAY
1. Structure
Although the basic pay table's fundamental structure has not changed since its
establishment in 1949, a number of changes have skewed its effectiveness and equality.
These changes have resulted from legislation directing various pay adjustments, pay
raises, pay caps, and the creation of new pay grades. Several problems in the current pay
table have resulted as a consequence of the changes. First, the distinction between pay of
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different grades at similar years of service is too small to provide a clear reward or
incentive for promotion. This demonstrates inconsistent relationships between pay
differentials, with no reasons for differences. Also, pay raises range from 2.8 to 38.2
percent and longevity raises from 1 .3 to 21 .8 percent. Finally, in some cases years of
service weigh almost as heavily as promotion, possibly weakening incentive for
performance. [Ref 5, p. 5]
Like any compensation system, the fundamental objective of the basic pay system
should be to attract and retain quality personnel. Basic pay should also provide
recognition for military status. Because rank is a measure of both past performance and
current responsibility, it should be the largest source of variation in basic pay. Variations
in pay among members must be competitive and efficient. Early experience with the all-
volunteer force has demonstrated that significant deviations from these compensation
goals undermine morale and personnel readiness. From the DoD and the taxpayer
perspective, basic pay should support quality forces of sufficient size. [Ref. 5, pp. 41-43] ^
The primary requirement of military basic pay is that it should establish
appropriate pay differentials for military rank and status. Also, since the military's
closed personnel system only hires at the lowest level of the organization, basic pay
should recognize the key career retention decisions. Basic pay compensation should be
consistent with key service-length characteristics of obligated service requirements.
A RAND study in 1 993 emphasized that a closed hierarchical organization must
design compensation policies that encourage individuals to: (1) Work hard and
effectively; (2) self-sort into ranks to which they are best suited; and (3) leave when it is
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in the organization's best interest. Specifically, a skewed pay structure is required to
motivate effort and influence self-sorting. [Ref. 3, p. 189]
This study examined the structure of the U.S. military compensation system to
determine whether or not it meets these criteria. Figure 2. 1 shows the average annual
increase in basic pay for promotion to the rank shown based on the 1 998 pay tables.



















E-2 E-3 E-4 E-5 E-6 E-7 E-8 E-9 0-2 0-3 0-4 0-5 0-6 0-7
Rank
Figure 2.1
Source: Adapted from Beth J. Asch and John T. Warner, Professionals on the Front Line:
Two Decades of the All-Volunteer Force , Brassey's, 1996.
Examination of Figure 2-1 shows that average annual pay increases due to
promotion are small and relatively constant ($1346 to $2972) through the first six
enlisted ranks and increase in the last three enlisted grades ($3728 to $5939). Of
particular interest is that the average increase from E-7 to E-8 is greater than the increase
from E-8 to E-9. For officers the average promotion increase to 0-4 is considerably less
than the increase to 0-3 ($4500 verses $8567). On average the promotion increment
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increases from 0-6 to 0-7 is significantly greater ($16,550) than any other promotion
increase, but with regards to providing promotion incentive is most likely not as
significant.
2. Pay Tables
One issue affecting military compensation is whether current pay tables should be
converted to reflect time in grade instead of time in service. The argument is that better
performance is reflected in faster promotion and that performance should be rewarded in ^
the pay system. Currently, using time in service as the measure for increased pay.
individuals who follow the fast track of early promotions have no significant
compensation advantage over an average member after the average member is promoted
to the same rank.
However, like the time in service format, the time in grade theory has flaws of its
own. First, the time in grade format overlooks the reasons why some individuals may be
promoted faster than others. For example, within services and ratings, faster promotion
generally recognizes superior performance. However, there are at least two specific
incidents where this theory does not hold. First, there are significant differences within
and among services in the amount of time it takes to reach a given rank. For example, it
takes longer for an officer in the Marine Corps to reach 0-3 than it does in the Navy.
Thus the time in grade format would magnify this inter-service pay differential by giving
a permanent pay advantage to individuals promoted faster, even though the promotion is
not the result of individual merit. [Ref. 5, p. 43]
Second, there are significant differences in promotion among different skill levels
or rates within the same service. For, example it takes longer to reach the grade of E-5 in
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the Navy's Master-at-Arms skill than it does as an Intelligence Specialist. Such
situations arise because promotions are based on vacancies in specific ratings. If
retention is high in one skill area relative to another, promotions in the high retention
category will be slower. [Ref. 5, p. 43]
In the military's closed personnel system, all personnel start at the bottom and rise
in rank one step at a time. The way in which individuals ascend is determined by
policies, laws, and force structure, which are beyond individual control. Although it can
be argued that a time in grade format would motivate performance, it may be perceived
as inequitable within the military. Such perceived inequities would likely undermine the
motivation of pay based on promotion.
S/ The 7th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation found that time in service
is superior in format to time in grade because the time in service format offers greater
rewards for performance. Also, in the current format, there are places where pay raises
can be shifted to account for increases in rank relative to time in service. The review
concluded that the time in service format tends to protect the taxpayer during times of
faster promotions and to protect service members during slower promotions. [Ref. 5, p.
44]
3. Pay Gap
Of all the identified problems with basic pay, the most prominent and visible is
the decline of military pay relative to civilian wage movement. Not since 1982 have
military and private sector pay been considered comparable. Since then, Congress has
capped military pay raises at one-half percent below the average American's pay increase
in 1 1 of the past 1 5 years. The cumulative effect of this action is that the pay gap now
exceeds 1 3 percent and will continue to widen. Rep. Steven Buyer, Chairman of The
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House National Security Personnel Subcommittee and Sen. Dirk Kempthorne, Chairman
of the Senate Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee, feel that the gap will increase to
over 15 percent by 2001 if nothing is done. Members of Congress are favoring a change
in the way military pay raises are determined. The proposal is to eliminate the pay link,
contained in Title 37 of the U.S. Code, which would match military pay raises with
increases in the private sector. Defense and service officials support the idea of changing
the current link between civil service pay and military pay and believe recruitment and
retention would improve from such a measure. [Ref. 7, p. 1] *K
The FY 1998 DoD Authorization Act included a pay increase of 2.8 percent,
which equals pay raises received by the average private sector American using the
Bureau of Labor Statistics Employment Cost Index. This pay increase is a sign that the
Administration and Congress recognize the value of parity between military and private
sector pay.
F. COMPARING MILITARY AND CIVILIAN WAGE GROWTH
1. Employment Cost Index
The pay gap is defined as the percentage difference between military and civilian
pay growth. The index currently used to measure civilian pay growth is the Employment
Cost Index (ECI), which identifies pay growth in the civilian labor force at large. The
ECI is a fixed-base weight index which shows how much the cost of a fixed bundle of
labor increases over time. It was selected by Congress in the Federal Employees Pay
Comparability Act (FEPCA) of 1990 to link federal employees" pay to private sector
wages. The index, formed from census data, represents approximately 90 percent of the
23
civilian labor force (excluding self-employed individuals) and is updated every ten years
from Census data. [Ref. 5. pp. 111-112]
2. Defense Employment Cost Index
Previous studies by RAND and the Quadrennial Review of Military
yj- Compensation (QRMC) have developed and recommended using a measure called the
Defense Employment Cost Index (DECI). The DECI is a measure of civilian pay growth
for the subset of civilian workers whose composition by age, education, occupation,
gender, and race are similar to those of active duty military personnel. [Ref. 8, p. ix] The
DECI is a variable-base weight index that changes from year to year proportionally with
changes in the composition of active duty personnel. Data on military personnel for the
DECI comes from the Defense Manpower Data Center's (DMDC) records on active duty
personnel. The DECI formula is determined by that year's active duty personnel with
respect to gender, education, occupation, age, and race. The civilian wage data come
from the Current Population Survey (CPS). The percentage change in DECI from year to
year indicates increases in military pay necessary to keep pace, on average, with the
civilian wage growth of people like those currently on active duty. [Ref. 8, pp.3-4]
Compared to those in the general civilian work force, active duty personnel are
younger and more likely to have completed at least high school. Therefore, their
occupational grouping differs. Also, military members are predominately male and tend
to have larger numbers of minority members in proportion to civilian society. These
differences are significant because civilian wage changes are not the same for every
group. In fact, they commonly differ by age, education, occupation, and gender. The
DECI attempts to account for all these differences, but the ECI only considers
occupation.
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The DECI pay gap was under 4 percent until 1988. In 1990 it was figured to be
approximately 6 percent, and has fallen since. In 1992 the DECI-based pay gap was 0.1
percent. However, most policymakers agree that even though the DECI accurately
reflects the average civilian wage growth that military personnel would expect if they
were civilian workers, it does not distinguish between differential wage growth by group.
In fact, it shows that there is no pay gap for junior enlisted men with a high school
education. Rather, this group has achieved a 7 percent greater basic pay increase than
civilians in the same group. Senior enlisted men have not done as well as junior enlisted,
but have still managed a relative wage growth 2.7 percent greater than civilian
counterparts under DECI. The pattern changes for enlisted woman and officers. The pay-
gaps for all groups are summarized in Table 2-3. Table 2-3 shows especially large pay
gaps for female officers in relation to their civilian counterparts. [Ref. 8, p. 17]
Table 2-3
Summary of DECI Pay Gap
Group Pay Gap under DECI
Enlisted Junior, male, high school only +7.3 percent (no gap)
Enlisted Senior, male, high school only +2.7 percent (no gap)
Enlisted Junior, female, high school only -7.4 percent
Enlisted Senior, female, high school only -7.2 percent
Officer, Junior, male, college -16.1 percent
Officer, Senior, male, college -10.9 percent
Officer, Junior, female, college -20.0 percent
Officer. Senior, female, college -23.4 percent
Source: Adapted from: Hosek, James R., Christine E. Peterson, and Joanna Z. Heilbrunn,
Military Pay Gaps and Caps , RAND, 1994.
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Because the FEPCA specifically identifies the ECI as the index on which to base civil
service and military pay adjustments, the DECI has little to no impact on defense
manpower considerations. [Ref. 8, pp. 19-20]
G. PAY GAP HISTORY
The 7th Quadrennial Review of Military- Compensation in 1992 found that since
1981, civilian wage growth, as measured by the ECI, has outstripped Military pay raises
by 12 percent. Yet, the 1980's proved to be a remarkable decade with regard to
2& successful retention within the military. This paradox has led policymakers to question
the effectiveness of the ECI as a comparative measure between civilian and military
wages. The explanation for the pay paradox was that the ECI did not really capture the
civilian wage growth relevant to members and potential members of the military'. [Ref. 5,
p. 1 1 3] A more likely explanation would be that it takes time for changes in such a
system to have an effect on recruiting and retention. Most recent comparisons on
military and civilian pay have used 1982 as the base year for computations. The reason
for this is that 1 982 is considered to be the last year that the pay gap was considered to be
negligible. [Ref. 8, p. 5]
Following severe recruiting and retention problems in the 1970's, military pay
raises in 1981 and 1982 were intended to restore military/civilian pay to the overall
relationship prevailing at the beginning of the All-Volunteer Force in 1972. Pay
adjustments in 1972 were thought adequate in establishing comparability between
civilian and military pay by the Gates Commission.
However, in 1981 the service chiefs were able to get a 14.3 percent pay raise
included in the defense budget to close the gap between salaries in the private sector and
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the military. At that time the estimated pay gap was about 8 percent, but the services
were having problems in recruiting and retention. [Ref. 9, p. 3] The Defense Department
had considered spreading the pay raise over two years, but members of Congress
encouraged them to ask for it all at once. The combined increases in 1981-82 raised ^C
military pay by 25 percent and quelled the recruiting and retention problems. The
improvements in recruit quality and retention that followed in subsequent years proved
the compensation increase effective. [Ref. 8, p. 5]
H. ANNUAL PAY ADJUSTMENT
Keeping military pay attractive relative to civilian incomes has been the intent of
Congress since the military pay statute of 1 967. That statute intended to "'Insure that
uniformed services personnel will, in the future, be given increases in the level of their
compensation comparable to that enjoyed by their civilian contemporaries" [Ref. 10, p.
3]. While individuals decide to continue a military career based on more than just pay,
pay is usually important. It is clear that military pay is most effective as a recruitment
and retention tool if maintained over time at a level comparable to civilian employment
opportunities. In most cases, poor recruiting and retention numbers signify the need for
pay adjustments.
However, waiting for these signals prior to adjusting pay can be detrimental
because of the costs associated with recruiting and training replacements. The decade
leading up to 1 992 had been one in which the armed forces had remarkable success in
maintaining a high quality force.
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Since 1 992 a remarkably different picture has been presented. In recent articles
service chiefs have expressed increasing concerns with regard to retention and recruiting.
They have attributed problems in these areas to a good economy, low propensity among
American youth to enlist in the Armed Services, and increased deployment and
operational commitments due to contingency operations.
An Army Times article published 1 June 1998 stated that the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff was urging top military leaders to push for better pay. It stated that at an
unusual "24 star meeting" on May 19, military leaders were briefed on the size, extent,
and long-term cost of letting military pay fall behind civilian compensation. The article
indicated that "the meeting could mark a turning point in the debate over military pay and
readiness." [Ref. 9, p. 3] Until recently the service chiefs have been reluctant to
acknowledge retention and recruiting problems. Some members of Congress have
become frustrated that the services will not ask for more money. [Ref. 1 1, p. 3] It would
be difficult, however, at a time of flat defense budgets and low inflation to close the pay
gap with a single raise like the one approved under the Reagan administration in 1981.
>*j/ Also, military leaders may assume that budgeting for such an increase is a zerojum game
and that sources for any proposed increases must be identified. The estimated cost to
close the gap is about $5.2 billion annually. [Ref. 9, p. 3] Perhaps more appealing is the
notion of closing the gap three or four percentage points a year. Though this may be a
less costly alternative to closing the gap with a single increase, it would most likely fail to
address the negative effect on recruiting and retention now in effect.
There are critics who argue that the pay gap is myth and that service members are
in fact paid substantially more than their civilian counterparts. They stress that "lobbyists
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have pushed a bogus pay gap for so long that it has been accepted as fact by politicians,
reporters and military personnel." [Ref. 12, p. 31] They regard the Employment Cost
Index as an ineffective measurement of comparison between private sector and military
wage growth, because basic pay, while the bulk of the military pay, constitutes only part
of total military compensation. They identify longevity pay raises, health care,
commissary, and retirement benefits as portions of military compensation not considered
when making wage growth comparisons between the military pay and the ECI. Finally,
comparing military- wage increases to civilian wage growth using the ECI ignores
reenlistment bonuses, specials pays, and leave benefits that are common to many service
members. [Ref. 12, p. 31]
When comparing military pay to civilian pay, certain fringe benefits and
advantages are inevitably left out. A better measure of differences between military and
civilian compensation might be civilian equivalency rates. Civilian equivalency rates are
currently used by the Navy Working Capital Fund activities to reimburse Navy and
Marine Corps military personnel pay appropriations for the price of military personnel
working in these activities. The rate is derived from all costs required to compensate
active duty personnel in Navy Working Capital Fund activities including base pay,
allowances, special pay, bonuses and incentives, healthcare, and other benefits. The rates
are consistent with percentage figures presented earlier with respect to RMC (i.e.,
average RMC is approximately equal to the Civilian Equivalency Rate times 72%).
Table 2-4 shows the budgeted civilian equivalency rates for FY 1998. It reflects
budgeted values for FY 1998 and 1999. The FY 2000 and FY 2001 budget years




FY 1998 FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001
0-9 157,504 161,204 162,467 167,341
0-8 144,765 149,625 154,156 158,781
0-7 131,749 136.220 140,374 144,585
0-6 106,632 110,239 113,580 116,988
0-5 90,638 93,720 96,560 99.457
0-4 76,702 79,310 81,712 84,163
0-3 64,503 66,696 68.716 70,777
0-2 53,817 55,647 57.335 59,055
O-l 44,481 45,994 47,386 48,808
E-9 40,269 41,641 42,903 44,190
E-8 36,359 37,597 38,735 39,897
E-7 32,721 33,834 34,857 35,903
E-6 29,358 30,352 31,275 32.213
E-5 29,358 30,352 31,275 32,213
E-4 26,237 27,133 27,954 28,793
E-3 23,377 24,166 24,899 25,646
E-2 20,734 21,440 22,092 22,755
E-l 19,048 19,696 20,293 20,902
Source: Budget Guidance Memorandum 98-1 E, "Guidance for the Preparation and
Submission ofFY 2000 and 2001 Budget Estimates for the DON Budget Review.'
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HI. THE MILTARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM
A. INTRODUCTION
The Military Retirement Program is one of the most important benefits associated
with a career in the military. It applies to members of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps,
and Air Force. The current system is a noncontributory, defined-benefit plan dating back
to 1947. when Congress implemented a common system for both officer and enlisted
personnel. Standardized retirement laws for all services were brought about by the Army
and Air Force Vitalization Act of 1948. The act established 20 years as the minimum
requirement for voluntary retirement. Modifications by the Defense Officer Personnel
Act of 1981 and the Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986 were aimed at reducing the
cost of funding military retirement. [Ref. 6, p. B-4] However, the system still provides an
immediate lifetime annuity to those who separate with 20 or more years of service, but no
benefits to those who leave with fewer than 20 years.
Until 1984, the Pentagon had funded retirement pay on a "pay as you go" basis
where retirement costs were simply budgeted for annually. [Ref. 14, p. xi] The
Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1984 established a new method of funding
for military retirement in 1984. Under the new law. a normal cost funding_method for the }/-
military retirement system took effect on October 1, 1984. It required that DoD pay the
normal cost of the system and the Treasury make payments from general revenues to
amortize the unfunded liability. [Ref. 6. p. 1] The normal cost of the fund is the amount
required to fund future retirement benefits for personnel currently on active duty or in
reserve components of DoD. The cost is equal to a percentage of basic pay and differs
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for active and reserve forces, but within those categories it is identical for all services.
[Ref. 14. p. xii]
The old system had worked well with regard to paying retirees, but policymakers
were not accountable for decisions regarding force size and future outlays. Congress
insisted that DoD switch to an accrual system in which the services account for future
retirement obligations by transferring into the Military Retirement Fund (MRFJ cash
necessary to fund future retirement benefits for individuals on active duty each fiscal
year.
The present retirement system consists of three sets of noncontributory retirement
provisions, determined by each member's service entry date. Members are eligible to
retire after 20 years of service, and with the exception of flag officers and special cases,
must retire on or before 30 years of service.
Some in Congress assert that the current military retirement system is too
generous compared to civilian retirement plans. They claim that any plan that pays a
substantial annuity, with annual costjxf living_adjustments, to people who can retire at
such an early age is too expensive and should conform more with civilian retirement
plans. Military leaders and interest groups have fought successfully to preserve the
current system by stressing that conditions of military service are different than those of
civilian jobs, and a unique system is required to maintain a sufficient defense force to
reflect these unique service conditions.
B. RETIREMENT SYSTEM COMPONENTS
Most attention has focused on retired pay for non-disability active duty personnel
since it makes up the largest portion of retirement compensation cost and it affects the
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largest number of people. However, efforts at changing the military retirement system
have not been limited to the key non-disability portion. Dissatisfaction with survivor
benefits, evidenced by falling participation rates, led to congressional revision of existing
law in 1980. In 1998 lawmakers expressed concern that the subsidy for the Survivor
Benefit Plan (SBP) had fallen to 26 percent, well below the 40 percent objective set by
the Congress. The Committee on National Security stated that "the committee is
committed to exploring options that will increase the subsidy and make the program more
attractive to military retirees.
7
' [Ref. 15, p. 306] Also, reform proposals have been
targeted at reserve retirement spending and separation pay to individuals who leave r4<
involuntarily.
Non-disability retirement is often criticized because beneficiaries receive
payments at a much earlier age than their civilian peers. Also, disability, reserve, and
survivor benefit costs are determined by non-disability retirement benefits. [Ref. 1 6. p. 2]
For these reasons this thesis focuses primarily on non-disability retirement^pay when
referring to the military retirement system. In FY 1996, 1.29 million non-disability
retirees from active duty received a total of $23.86 billion. This constituted 82 percent of
retirement system outlays. [Ref. 6, p. A-2] A summary of Military Retirement System








Number of Retirees Dollar Amount
Non-Disability Retirement 1.29 Million $23.86 Billion
Disability Retirement 119.000 $1.49 Billion
Reserve Retirement 216.000 $2.11 Billion




Total 1.89 Million $29.01 Billion
Source: Adapted from Valuation of the Military Retirement System, Department of
Defense Office of the Actuary, 1996.
C. OBJECTIVES OF THE MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM
Most advocates agree that the main purpose of the retirement system, like other
compensation, is to attract and retain quality people. They stress that the system must
compete with the private sector for quality personnel at a reasonable cost to the taxpayer.
Also, the military retirement system must be a flexible tool for managing armed forces
manpower requirements.
The Valuation ofthe Military Retirement System states that there are five principal
motivations guiding the military retirement system. First, it must ensure that sendee in
the armed forces is competitive with other alternatives. It must also provide promotion
opportunities to young and able members. Because of the sacrifices made by military
careerists, some measure of economic security must be made available to those who serve
a full career. Additionally, to fulfill the Defense Department's role of defending the
American people, military leaders can use the retirement system to ensure experienced
personnel are available for recall in time of war or national emergency. Finally, during
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times of decreasing budgets and deficit reduction, leaders must ensure that system costs
are reasonable to the taxpayer. [Ref. 6, p. B-2]
For the most part, these are the same principles included in the formal definition
used by the 5 th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation in 1984. Despite this
formal definition, the retirement system is widely viewed strictly as a force management
tool. The combination of 20-year vesting and the payment of an immediate annuity after
20 years of service implies a system designed to promote a young force and ensure ^
experienced personnel advance to higher ranks until they are encouraged or forced to
retire. Vesting refers to the amount or time that a worker must remain with an employer
before becoming entitled to a portion of retirement benefits. The current military
retirement system generally serves as a strong retention tool after a certain career point,
convincing personnel to stay at least 20 years. 1996 retention data show that about 10 to
15 percent of enlisted personnel and 30 to 40 percent of officers become eligible for
retirement. Of the percentage of personnel who reach 10 years of service, about 70
percent of enlisted and 90 percent of officers become retirement eligible. [Ref. 17, p. 5] Jq
D. CURRENT MILITARY RETIREMENT BENEFITS
The current Military Retirement System has undergone significant changes since
its inception. What started as a means to convince service members to commit to a career
of service to our nation's defense has evolved into a complex system of sub-systems that
we have today. Recent changes are the result of fiscal pressures from deficit reduction
and attempts to maintain balance between military retirement benefits and those available
in the private sector. Manpower personnel would argue that changes to the system have
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been used to achieve manpower levels consistent with national security. The three
systems currently used are discussed below.
1. Final Basic Pay
Members entering military service prior to September 8, 1980 are eligible to retire
after 20 years of service at 50 percent of their final basic pay up to a maximum of 75
percent of basic pay with 30 years of service. After retirement, the annual stipend is
adjusted annually to reflect inflation, based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI). This
retirement system is commonly referred to as Final Basic Pay. [Ref. 6, p. A-2]
2. High Three
The Defense Officer Personnel Act of 1981 placed members who had entered
service between September 8, 1980 and July 31, 1986 in the High Three system. They
are eligible to retire after 20 years of service, but the amount of their initial retired pay
will be equal to 50 percent of the average of their three highest years of basic pay. The
averaging lowers retirement pay by approximately 6 percent annually from the Final
Basic Pay System. [Ref. 6, p. A-2]
3. REDUX
The Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1984 required the military to
pay the normal cost of the fund. On June 30, 1986 President Reagan signed the Military
Retirement Reform Act of 1986. The change to the retirement system was the result of
action by Congress to reduce the non-disability retirement accrual costs of the military-
retirement fund by $2.9 billion in fiscal year 1986. [Ref. 19. p. 521] Congress changed
the system in 1986 primarily to reduce the system's cost and increase the incentive for
personnel to complete 30 years of service. [Ref. 6, p. A-2]
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For members entering after July 31, 1986, the amount of their initial retired pay is
based on the average of their three highest years of basic pay. However, the multiplier
for 20 years of service is only 40 percent, with a 3.5 percent per year increase up to 75
percent at 30 years of service. Additionally, inflation offsets are capped at one percent
below the CPI. This erodes the purchasing power of retirement until age 62, when a one-
time restoration of the value of the pension occurs. This plan is commonly referred to as
REDUX. [Ref. 6, p. A-2]
The Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986 sparked a lot of controversy.
Changing the retirement system was opposed by the Pentagon, and fears over how the
new system would affect readiness surfaced during negotiations. However, almost as
soon as the bill became law, the furor surrounding it died, primarily because those
already in uniform at that time were not affected by it.
Appendix A compares the three retirement systems for an 0-5 and E-7. both with
20 years of service. Assumptions are for a typical 0-5 at age 42 and E-7 at age 39. It
also assumes a 3.5 percent annual inflation adjustment for the Final Pay and High Three
systems and a 2.5 percent adjustment for REDUX. At age 62, REDUX retirees catch up
to High 3 retirees for one year, but fall behind again because of lower cost-of-living
adjustments.
E. NET PRESENT VALUE OF THE MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM
From a policymaker's view point, compensation, including military retirement, is
necessary as a force management tool. The prospect of twenty-year retirement is a
delayed incentive that induces personnel to invest in military-specific job skills, accept
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hazardous assignments, and generally exert work effort early in their careers and
gradually promote to positions of higher authority and responsibility. For such a system
to be effective it must offer incentive for quality individuals to stay the path and complete
the minimum twenty-year requirement.
With the first members eligible to retire under the REDUX system now more than
halfway through their careers, there is concern among policymakers with regard to
retention rates, and the fact that benefits under REDUX may not be sufficient when
compared with the High-Three and Final Pay systems. The changes made under the
Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986 may have underestimated the effect that such
changes would have on retaining quality personnel. An April 27, 1998 Navy Times
Article stated, "If one of the purposes of the military retirement system is to encourage
experienced, well-trained troops to serve for at least 20 years, the 40-percent plan is a
flop." [Ref. 19, p. 12] The article addresses the fact that more experienced personnel are
getting out of the service, taking with them years of experience and training that can't be
replaced. It states that.
Some feel cheated and can't fathom why their long-term service
should have less value than someone who came on board just a few-
months or years before they did. Many others are deciding, or are on the
verge of deciding, that the lure of a scaled-back retirement check simply is
not worth the hassles of remaining in an increasingly busy, deployed, and
understaffed Navy. [Ref. 19, p. 12]
Even service chiefs of staff have testified before the House of Representatives
Committee on National Security that the decision more than a decade ago to decrease
retirement benefits is hurting retention and needs to be addressed. [Ref. 15, p. 305] It's
becoming clear that REDUX is not nearly as effective at convincing members to
complete a career as the 50 percent systems used to be. [Ref. 19, p. 12]
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There are many considerations service members make when deciding whether to
stay or leave the service. Part of this process involves weighing the advantages and
disadvantages associated with a full career. Specifically, individuals must decide
whether the benefit of retirement is sufficient to provide an acceptable lifestyle for the
member and his family in the future. Even more compelling is the view of the service
members as to whether he or she could do better elsewhere. If the REDUX system
erodes individuals' confidence in future retirement benefits their retention decisions
could be affected.
Retired Air Force Colonel Steven Strobridge, the Deputy Director of Government
Relations for the Retired Officers Association, argues that the only true way to compare
the current retirement plans is using the present^value approach. [Ref. 19. p. 14] Net
present value represents the discounted monetary value of net benefits, i.e., it accounts
for the erosion in the buying power of a benefit that occurs due to inflation. Net present
value is computed by discounting future benefits using an appropriate discount rate.
Discounting future benefits reflects the time value of money. The higher the discount
rate, the lower is the present value of future cash flows. This implies that benefits are
worth more if they are experienced sooner. [Ref. 20, p. 3]
The proper discount rate to use depends on whether the benefits are measured in
real or nominal terms. A real discount rate that has been adjusted to eliminate the effect
of inflation should be used to discount constant-dollar benefits and costs. The real
discount rate is approximated by subtracting the expected inflation rate from the nominal
interest rate. [Ref. 20, p. 8]
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When making decisions regarding retirement, individuals are most likely to
discount future benefits to reflect the value in present day dollars. Individuals usually
discount future benefits at a high rate. Individuals tend to measure opportunity costs
based on interest rates. Because military retirement is considered a long-term benefit,
most individuals would tend to favor the use of long-term interest rates in measuring the
opportunity costs associated with a full career in the military.
The net present value of future cash flows based on data from Appendix A is
shown in Table 3-2 for the three retirement systems. Appendix A compares projected
annual cash flows for typical O-5's and E-7's with 20 years of service under each
retirement plan. Table 3-2 also shows percentage differences for each system.
Table 3-2






REDUX FINAL PAY HIGH
THREE
REDUX
NPV(IO) $414,918 $379,913 $298,973 $193,758 $182,054 $140,641
% 100 92 72 100 94 73
NPV (7) $617,331 $565,249 $452,636 $286,457 $269,153 $211,056
% 100 92 73 100 94 74
The net present value analysis shows that the REDUX system appears to be
approximately 26 to 28 percent less generous than the Final Pay system and 19 to 21
percent less generous than the High Three system. The comparison assumes a 3 percent
inflation rate and discount rates of 10 and 7 percent respectively. The 10 percent
discount rate reflects a conservative assumption based on the 12 percent average return of
the S&P 500 index of stocks since 1960 and the Dow Jones Industrial Average of 1 1.43
percent (1973-1991). [Ref. 21, pp. 61-63] The 7 percent discount rate reflects the 30-year
average nominal interest rate on 30-year treasury notes and bonds. [Ref. 20, Appendix C]
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Table 3-2 illustrates that the REDUX system is less generous than the other retirement
systems regardless of whether individual members discount future benefits at a historical
or conservative rate.
For those members who entered active duty after August 1 , 1 986 and are now
reaching key retention years, REDUX creates an incentive to leave the service, since the
return from staying has been reduced (a loss in future retirement). While the perceived
loss varies by individual members, across a wide range of reasonable discount rate
assumptions, the loss is significant. In fact, the loss is equal to or greater than current
retention incentives such as pilot bonus and selective reenlistment bonuses. For example,
assuming a 10 percent personal discount rate and 3 percent annual adjustment for
inflation, the net present value of future payments from aviation career incentive pay for
an 0-5 aviator with 20 years of service is $56, 886.36. Also, the maximum selective
reenlistment bonus paid to eligible enlisted members is $45,000. Neither figure offsets
the reductions in retirement benefits resulting from REDUX as illustrated in Table 3-2. If
REDUX causes members to think about retirement benefits with greater uncertainty,
retention could be impacted negatively.
F. THE MILITARY RETIREMENT FUND
1. Purpose
The Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1984 established the
"Department of Defense Military Retirement Fund." It also established an independent
three-member DoD Retirement Board of Actuaries, appointed by the President. The
Board of Actuaries is required to review valuations of the retirement system, determine
the method of amortizing unfunded liabilities, to report annually to the Secretary' of
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Defense, and to report to the President and the Congress on the fund's status at least
every four years. [Ref. 6. p. 1] The fund is to be "used for the accumulation of funds in
order to finance on an actuarially sound basis liabilities of the Department of Defense
under military retirement and survivor benefit programs/' [Ref. 18, p. 799]
2. Accrual Funding Method
The establishment of the accrual method of funding required that each service
transfer into the fund each year dollars to pay for future retirement benefits. The amount
paid into the fund represents a percentage of basic pay paid to all service members. It is
paid from DOD's military personnel account and is based on actuarial and economic
assumptions. [Ref. 16, p. 11] Actuarial assumptions include such things as the rates of
retirement and the longevity of retirees. Economic factors include assumptions about
interest rates, pay raises, and cost of living adjustments. The percentage differs for active
duty and reserve personnel, but within those categories it is identical for all services.
[Ref. 14, p. xiv] In FY 95, fund transfers equaled 35.5 percent of the active duty basic
pay and 10.5 percent of reserve pay. [Ref. 14, p. xii]
Annually, the Treasury Department transfers an amount equal to one year's
amortized payment for the pre-1984 liability, adjusted for changes in assumptions and
experience. The money in the fund is invested in government securities and draws
interest. Transfers into the fund by the Treasury and its investment transactions represent
intra-governmental transfers and do not count as outlays to the federal government. [Ref.
14, p. 24] Hence, actuarial gains that reduce Treasury's payments into the fund have no
effect on the deficit. They do, however, represent an outlay to DoD, because they are
budgeted for in the annual defense appropriation for military personnel. [Ref. 14, p. xii]
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If the Department of Defense were to share in future gains and reduce its payment
into the fund, spending the difference on other priorities such as modernization,
manpower, or readiness, the deficit would rise even though the DoD topline and DoD
outlays would not change. Actuarial losses would have the opposite effect, reducing
funds available to the Department for other purposes with a fixed topline. Any proposal
to allow DoD to share in gains without agreeing to a lower topline from actuarial losses
will, therefore, most likely be met with resistance by the administration and Congress.
Historically, assumptions used by the Board of Actuaries have resulted in gains more
frequently than losses. In fact, gains have occurred in every year, resulting in the transfer
of tens of billions of dollars from the Defense Department to the Treasury. [Ref. 14, p.
25]
In essence, the establishment of the military retirement fund allowed
policymakers, budget and manpower analysts, and Congress to realize immediately the
long-term consequences of policy changes affecting personnel and retirement. The FY96




Normal Cost as a Percent of Basic Pay
Full Time (Active duty) Final Pay High-3 Redux Weighted
Non-disability benefits 34.8% 31.3% 26.4% 29%
Disability benefits 1.1 1.0 .9 1.0
Survivor Benefits .8 .8 .6 .7
Total 36.7% 33.0% 28.0% 30.7%
Part Time (Reserve) Final Pay High-3 Redux Weighted
Non-disability benefits 9.4% 8.9% 8.1% 8.5%
Disability benefits .4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Survivor benefits 0.0 .4% .3%
Total 9.8% 9.3% 8.4% 8.8%
Source: Valuation of the W ilitary Retirem(:nt System, Derlartment of Defense Office of
the Actuary, 1996.
Changes from year to year in the normal cost as a percentage of basic pay are
attributable to changes in force structure from downsizing and reductions in the Final Pay
system costs due to a decrease in the number of retirees due to mortality. Therefore, the
normal cost of the MRF to DoD constantly fluctuates from year to year. Because recent
trends have been toward reducing retirement benefits, trend analysis should reveal a
decrease in future costs.
3. Unfunded Liability
When the fund was established, the unfunded costs of retirement benefits already
accrued became apparent. The unfunded liability as of September 30, 1984 was $528.7
billion. The unfunded liability is amortized over 50 years with payments made each year
to the Military Retirement Fund from the Treasury Department. Changes to the amount
of the unfunded liability can occur due to changes in economic assumptions, changes in
retired pay, or differences between expected accounting gains or losses in the fund. [Ref.
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17. p. 12] The value of the unfunded liability as of September 30, 1996 was $490.4
billion. This was 6.3 percent lower than the expected unfunded liability of $523.1 billion.
The initial unfunded liability is expected to be fully amortized in 2033. [Ref. 6. pp. 12-
13]
4. Department of Defense Accrual Cost
The military retirement accrual cost for active duty personnel was $1 1 billion in
fiscal year 1996. DoD paid this amount into the Military Retirement Fund for future
obligations generated by current personnel. Trends in the DoD budget show that the
normal cost of the MRF as a percentage of basic pay has declined sharply since the
inception of accrual accounting in 1985. This decline is largely due to service members
being under less generous retirement plans and changes to the actuarial assumptions
based on experience. However, military retirement normal costs remain a significant
portion of the DoD budget. They comprised approximately 16 percent of DoD's total
$70.7 billion personnel costs in 1995. [Ref. 17, p. 19]
The Department of the Navy Biennial Budget Estimates for 1998 indicate a
retired pay accrual cost of $2,568 billion. The budget estimates call for a total of $8,429
billion in basic pay for the Department of the Navy in 1998. [Ref. 13, p. 13] These
figures indicate the Department of the Navy normal cost as a percentage of basic pay to
be 30.47%.
5. Military Retirement Fund Problems
There are two perceived problems with current fund operations. First, if the fund
experiences an actuarial gain, only the Treasury Department benefits. For example, in
the past decade the fund has experienced gain of about $288 billion, all of which went to
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reduce the Treasury's liability. [Ref. 14, p. xvii] Arguably, DoD's outlay could have
been reduced by a significant fraction of this amount. [Ref. 14, p. 24]
The second issue in the funding process is that the services transfer to the fund
amounts equal to a percentage of basic pay for active duty and reserve service members.
This policy makes no differentiation by service. Furthermore, it does not distinguish
between officer and enlisted content and assumes that all services retire service members
at an identical rate.
However, if accrual percentages were computed for each service they would
differ significantly. In fact, the current system causes the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps
to carry several hundred millions of dollars a year of Air Force personnel costs. Since the
liability is funded from personnel funds the result is decreased compensation for
personnel in those services. [Ref. 14, p. xix]
G. PERCEIVED PROBLEMS WITH THE MILITARY RETIREMENT
SYSTEM
Despite its ability to stand the test of time, the twenty-year retirement system has
been controversial from the beginning. Reports by the Joint Army-Navy Pay Board in
1947 and the Hook Commission in 1948 reflect some of these initial concerns. More
recently critics have argued that the system is excessively costly, unfair to the vast
majority of military entrants who do not serve a full 20-years, inefficient, and not
responsive to force management requirements. They feel the current retirement system
makes it difficult to change the size or composition of the force. [Ref. 4, p. 2]
Data show that the services are reluctant to involuntarily-separate personnel with
less than 20 but more than 1 years of service because of the financial consequences for
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service members and the resulting impact on morale. The twenty-year system creates an
implicit contract to mid-careerists and induces the services to retain more middle
management than they might otherwise. This particular problem was highlighted by the
need to induce separations or compensate separated members with less than 20 years of
service during the recent reduction in force. [Ref. 17. p. 5]
1. Excessive Costs
Critics maintain that today's military needs many service members for less than
20 or 30 years and may want to retain others for longer. Participants in a 1 996 GAO
survey supported lengthening careers for senior officers and shortening them for other
officers because of the increased investments made in both the formal education and joint
operational experience of senior officers. [Ref. 17. p. 5] Defense analyst (and later,
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology) Jacques Gansler noted.
"The military retirement, though politically loaded, is likely to be forced to change
because of cost considerations. More and more people have been retiring at about 40
years of age, depriving the services of their expertise and collecting retired pay for the
rest of their lives." [Ref. 4, p. 2] He implies that military retirees are departing before
the service would like for them to do so and are receiving excessive benefits at the
expense of taxpayers. [Ref. 4, p. 2]
2. No Provision for Vesting
Recently critics have charged that it is unfair for 20-year retirees to receive a
retirement annuity for life while others who serve for shorter periods receive nothing. Of
all officers in the service only 30 to 40 percent of the entrants will stay for a full career.
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Likewise, only 10 to 15 percent of enlisted entrants will stay to receive some retirement
benefit.
These critics argue that the military should be brought under the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act's (ERISA) early vesting requirements. ERISA is the
federal law that requires private sector employers to vest employees in their retirement
systems, usually after five years of service. [Ref. 3, p. 176] A November 18, 1991,
editorial in the Navy Times declared that "The unfairness of this system generally
escapes the notice of anyone other than service people who, after serving honorably for
five, ten, or fifteen years leave the military with nothing but a handshake. The
drawdown, however, is shedding more light on the inequity."[Ref 3, p. 176]
The issue of vesting must be considered most important in reducing the cost of the
retirement system without fundamentally altering its structure. As noted earlier, an
effective system must recognize two distinct purposes of the military retirement system:
(1) to provide age old benefits to eligible personnel and (2) provide an inducement to
leave the service prior to the age of full retirement from the labor force. It is reasonable
then that the policy issues to be addressed are: (1) How long should individuals serve
before becoming eligible for retirement benefits? and (2) Depending on experience,
occupation, and individual performance, at what point should individuals be encouraged
or forced to separate from the service? [Ref. 3, p. 196] Currently the answer to both for
the majority of military retirees is twenty years.
3. Hampers Force Management
The system is criticized for hampering force management in different ways. First,
it constrains the experience distributions of the force. The services determine how many
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personnel are needed for each pay grade, and then obtain desired distributions in each
grade by translating requirements into a year of service distribution. The desired force
levels are based largely on what can be supported with retention patterns, and on the
structure the services would choose without compensation system constraints. [Ref. 3. p.
1 76] Critics argue that force structure should be determined by mission requirements and
national defense objectives.
Because military personnel must serve 20 years before receiving any entitlement,
the services have been reluctant to separate personnel with close to 20 years of service.
Also, the current military retirement system may hinder the goal of achieving a force of
the right size and composition because it provides the same incentive to all categories of
personnel. This implies that 20 years may not be the optimal career length for all
personnel.
4. Inflexible
Although it would be expected that the services need different experience levels
in different skills, the system produces similar experience distributions among a broad
spectrum of military skills. Some skills require youth and vigor while others require
experienced technical expertise. Investments are made in individual skill training only to
result in those skills not being fully utilized by the member because of promotions and
job assignments.
The Army, for example, requires large numbers of personnel in the infantry
divisions, but relatively few at the more senior levels. As individuals remain on active
duty their infantry skills are no longer required and they are relegated to desk jobs in the
Pentagon, staffjobs, or other clerical positions. This illustrates that mid-level personnel
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in the Army with combat skills, who are not yet vested in the retirement system, are
sometimes assigned to other "infrastructure" jobs for the remainder of their twenty-year
careers.
The Air Force and Navy, however, require more experienced personnel in mid-
level and senior positions. This is evidence that the "one-shoe-fits-all" system may not
efficiently match the right people to the necessary job. The recent drawdown proves that
the current structure of the retirement system hampers the DoD's ability to respond to
force management issues in a timely manner." [Ref. 3, p. 176]
5. Retention
Despite critics' charges that the system is overly generous, declining trends in
recruiting and retention recently have forced policymakers to consider how REDUX is
affecting individual decisions to leave the services. A 1 994 RAND computer model
shows that the retirement cuts included in REDUX would affect retention. The study
indicates that officers would be 1 percent less likely to stay 20 years and enlisted would
be 20 percent less likely. [Ref. 19, p. 12]
In 1998 the House National Security Military Personnel Subcommittee agreed
that it was time to take another look at the REDUX system. Subcommittee Chairman,
Rep. Steve Buyer said there is no quick fix to the problem, but that his subcommittee has
begun discussions with the Pentagon to examine the issue. Service leaders feel that it
would be too costly and politically infeasible to switch back to the old system. Instead
senior leaders have concentrated on areas where they might make a positive impact for
current service members, for example, creating a thrift savings plan. [Ref. 19, p. 14]
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Raising compensation in other areas and recommending investments in Individual
Retirement Accounts are other options that could be considered.
H. OPTIONS FOR MODIFYING THE MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM
Perhaps the most important consideration for any retirement system is its
fundamental structure, i.e., defined benefit, defined contribution, or a combination of
both. With a defined benefit system, the benefit accrual formula, the formula for
inflation adjustments, and the point at which benefits are paid are established in advance
and relatively fixed. Risk to the employee is minimal. Under a defined contribution
plan, the amount employees can contribute, the level of matching funds, and investment
options must all be considered. Benefits are determined by a formula that includes these
factors as well as the performance of the investment selected. Risk to the employee is
maximized. Vesting issues are a consideration in either type of system. [Ref. 17, p. 29]
1. Vesting
Participants in a 1 996 GAO study all supported changes to the current system to
provide some benefits to personnel who serve less than 20 years. Common to all possible
proposals is that members would be vested earlier in a portion of their retirement
benefits, thereby decreasing the benefits associated with serving 20 years or more. One
proposal for vesting benefits earlier was adding a deferred annuity for individuals who
retire prior to completing 20 years of service. Payments on benefits would be deferred
until age 62 under such a plan. Advocates believe that such a plan would reduce costs
while maintaining most of the current incentive for personnel to remain for 20 years.
[Ref. 17, p. 30]
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2. Tax-Deferred Savings With or Without Matching Funds
Several participants in the survey proposed adding a tax-deferred savings plan
similar to a 401(K) plan. Although such a plan may not be regarded as early vesting, it
would provide a way for service members to achieve additional long-term savings.
Participants noted that this may offset the limited opportunity service members have to
build equity in a home. They also commented that most enlisted members would have
little extra income for a tax-deferred savings-plan. Upon GAO's request, the DoD
Actuary estimated the impact on retirement accrual costs of several options, measured by
the normal cost percentage, all of which retain the basic retirement feature of having an
immediate annuity after 20 years of service. [Ref. 17, p. 30]
a. Option 1: DeferredAnnuity
The first option calls for a deferred annuity for persons leaving with less
than 20 years of service. This option included two types of benefits in the form of a
deferred annuity for members who leave the military with at least 1 years of service.
One proposal (1 A) recommends not adjusting for inflation before age 62 and the other
(IB) does provide for inflation adjustments. Under 1A, adjustments for inflation are
included at one percentage point below the consumer price index (CPI) after age 62. In
(IB) the indexed benefit assumes cost-of-living increase during the deferral period of one
percentage point below the CPI. Benefits for members serving 20 years or more would
be the same as under the current system. [Ref. 1 7, p. 47]
Under the deferred annuity option ( 1 A) the normal cost to fund the MRF
would be 28.3 percent of basic pay. In FY 98 dollars this would represent a 2.4 percent
savings for the DoD. To the Department of the Navy this would represent a savings of
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$61.6 million per year. Likewise, option ( 1 B) would save the Navy approximately $5 1 .4
million in FY 98 dollars.
b. Option 2: Tax Deferred Savings Without Matching
The second (2) option is for a tax-deferred saving plan without
government matching funds. All personnel who serve a minimum of 20 years would
receive benefits as specified by the current military retirement system. In addition,
individuals would be allowed to participate in a Thrift Savings Plan, contributing up to 5
percent of their pay, but the government would not provide matching contributions.
Income tax on contributions would be deferred. [Ref. 17. p. 48]
Although option 2 would result in deferred savings for service members, there
would be no additional savings for the Department of Defense. It may even be more
costly because the costs associated with managing such a plan would have to be
accounted for. However, this option would most likely have a positive effect on retention
to some degree and may result in net savings when accounting for recruiting and training
replacement costs. This area will be discussed in more detail in Chapter V.
c. Option 3: Tax Deferred Savings With Matching
A tax-deferred savings plan with government matching funds is the third
(3) option. It represents a combination of both a defined benefit and defined contribution
plan. Under this plan all personnel who serve a minimum of 20 years of service would
receive benefits under the current system. In addition, individuals would be allowed to
participate in a Thrift Savings Plan where the government would match up to the 5
percent limit. Such a system would be identical to the Thrift Savings Plan under FERS.
[Ref. 17, p. 49]
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Option three would increase the normal cost of funding military retirement
by .08 percent. This would result in additional annual costs ofjust over $20 million to
the Navy. It reflects an increase of normal costs to 31 .5 percent of basic pay. Again, the
impact of such an option will be discussed in greater detail in chapter five. Specifically, it
will address a military defined contribution plan similar to the Federal Employee
Retirement System's Thrift Savings Plan with and without government matching funds.
d. Option 4: Graduated Vesting
The final proposed option (4) is for a graduated vesting schedule for
individuals leaving the service with less than 20 years of service. As under other options,
personnel who serve a minimum of 20 years of service would receive benefits under the
current system. Personnel who serve between 1 and 20 years are vested in an annuity
based on the current military retirement formula. The benefit is a combination of a
deferred annuity at 10 years of service and an immediate annuity at 20 years of service.
The benefit is not indexed for inflation until age 62. Adjustments at 1 percentage point
below the CPI are made after age 62. The actuary provided an estimate of the effect on
the percentage of normal cost by adding a mixed immediate and deferred annuity for
members who separate between 10 and 20 years of service. [Ref. 17, p. 50]
The actuary estimates that the normal cost under option four would be
29.9 percent assuming no change in retention patterns. This would result in savings of
.08 percent. However, under such a plan the actuary estimates that more members would
elect to separate between 10 and 20 years of service, reducing the normal cost to 24.7
percent, a savings of six percent from the current cost. This would amount to $154.1
million in annual savings. A member in the GAO survey commented that although
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earlier vesting options have been mentioned before, they were not implemented because
the services did not believe the options proposed would give them enough flexibility in
managing the force. Table 3-4 summarizes the details of each of the proposed options.
Table 3-4
Summary of Recommended Changes to the Military Retirement System
Options 1A& IB Option 2 Option 3 Option 4
Benefit Formula Same as REDUX 5 Percent of 1 year-5 percent Same as
or Contribution basic pay to 7 percent with REDUX
Level 20 years of
service.
Calculation Average of the 1 , 5 or 1 years Immediate Average of
Base or highest 3 years of service Eligibility highest 3 years
Eligibility
Timing of All personnel with Age 62 Age 62 Combination of










10 and 20 years
of service.
Actuary Output Normal Cost Immediate Increase normal The normal cost
Percentages: Contribution: costs to 3 1.5 percentage with
REDUX: 28 $3.1 billion percent. To adjusted
Non-Index: 28.3 Projected maintain normal decrement rate
Index: 28.7 Contributions costs of 28 is 24.7.
for 1 0-years of percent would With no change
service: require a in retention










Source: Adapted from Military Retirement: Possible Changes Merit Further Evaluation,
United States General Accounting Office.
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3. RAND Proposal
According to a 1996 RAND study, placing military personnel under a retirement
system similar to the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS) could save DoD
$2.4 billion per year and maintain the same size and quality force that we now have. The
system RAND analyzed included a defined benefit plan, a defined contribution plan, and
Social Security benefits. Under the plan, the defined benefit formula and provisions for
government matching of TSP contributions would be identical to that of FERS. Because
retirement benefits would be considerably less generous than the current system for those
who separate with 20 or more years of service, the RAND analysis provided for an active
duty pay raise sharply skewed toward the upper grades. The system also included
separation payments. The savings result from the fact that increases in basic pay and
separation payments were more than offset by retirement cost savings. [Ref. 17, p. 37]
The costs, advantages, and practicality of a military TSP modeled after the FERS plan
will be discussed further in Chapter V.
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IV. PAY AND RETIREMENT TRENDS IN THE CIVILIAN SECTOR
A. INTRODUCTION
Employee benefits are intended to promote economic security by insuring against
uncertain events and to raise living standards by providing certain services. Employee
benefit programs add to economic stability by helping to secure the income and welfare
of American families and the economy as a whole. Today's employment-based benefit
programs represent a commitment to provide some measure of security to active workers,
displaced and disabled workers, and their families. Most Americans receive some form
of employee benefits at some time in their lives. Those who do not will most likely
receive payments under some public assistance program. Nearly all U.S workers are
covered under Social Security Old-Age, Survivors, Disability and Health Insurance
(OASDHI). Also, more than one-half of full-time workers are covered by private
employment-based pension plans. [Ref. 22, p. 27]
The distinction between employment-based pensions and individual savings for
retirement has become blurred by the growth of defined contribution plans as both
primary and supplemental retirement vehicles. Plans such as 401(k), 403 (b). 457, and
individual retirement accounts (IRAs) require individuals to decide whether to
participate, and then to determine contribution levels and asset allocation. These
decisions will directly impact retirement income security for future generations of
retirees. In 1 994, there was more than $5 trillion invested in American pension and
retirement income programs. [Ref. 23, p. xi] The U. S. tax system has extended special
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treatment to these funds by not subjecting either contributions or the investment income
they earn to income tax unless they are paid to beneficiaries.
The growth of defined contribution plans has given many workers an opportunity
to save through a work-based, tax-deferred, retirement savings plan. The vast majority of
Americans have always needed to engage in personal savings in order to have adequate
retirement income. Others have assumed that Social Security, plus union or employer
pensions, would provide for a secure retirement. Recently, labor market restructuring,
global competition, and reports from the Social Security system trustees that Social
Security cannot be sustained as we know it today have increased attention to the need for
individual savings initiatives. This realization has raised concerns among employers,
unions, financial professionals, the media, and public officials about whether individuals
have the necessary education and tools to make informed decisions about saving and
investing. [Ref. 22, p. 1] Most of this attention has been focused on participant-directed
retirement accounts.
After a long period of steady growth in defined benefit plans, the spread of these
programs came to a gradual halt in the 1980s. In the last decade there has been a
significant shift toward defined contribution plans. By 1990, 80 percent of all private
sector retirement plans were of the defined contribution type. These plans had 39 percent
of the assets, received 65 percent of the contributions, and paid 49 percent of the benefits.
Since then a pattern has emerged in the private sector: large employers have moved
toward a combination of defined benefit and contribution plans while smaller
organizations have relied almost entirely on defined contribution plans. [Ref. 23, p. 1]
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The shift in relative emphasis toward defined contribution plans has some
consequences for retirement income assurance. First, there is no benefit promise in a
defined contribution plan. The benefit equals the sum of contributions made during wage
earning years plus investment earnings on assets. Next, contributions are not specified in
dollars or percentage of pay. It may vary with company profits or employee contribution
amounts. Finally, upon retirement many workers receive distributions in a lump sum.
Some roll over amounts into an IRA, others do not. [Ref. 23. p. 1]
In 1997 Congress allowed employees to save more money on their own for
retirement on a tax-deferred basis, and provided for other separate types of plans to
provide for special needs of small businesses and self-employed individuals. The
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 also included provisions for expanded educational
investment savings opportunities and savings for first time homeowners. [Ref. 24. pp. 2-
3] Though defined benefit plans have been the cornerstone of the American retirement
establishment as we know it since colonial times, recent trends brought on by changing
attitudes, demographics, and economics have focused retirement planning toward a
combination of both defined benefit and defined contribution systems.
B. DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS
In a defined benefit plan, the employer agrees to provide the employee a benefit
amount at retirement based on a specific formula. The formula is usually one of three
general types: a flat-benefit formula, a career-average formula, or a final-pay formula.
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1. Flat-Benefit Formula
Flat-benefit formulas pay a flat dollar amount for each year of service recognized
under the plan. [Ref. 25, p. 56] These plans are not as common as other benefit plans
because they do not offer the same flexibility to adjust for economic factors and could
result in excessive costs to the employer.
2. Career-Average Formula
There are two types of career-average formulas. Under the first type, participants
earn a percentage of the pay recognized for plan purposes in each year that they
participate. The second type averages the participant's annual salary over the period of
plan participation. At retirement, the benefit equals a percentage of the career-average
pay, multiplied by the number of years of service. [Ref. 25, p. 56]
3. Final Pay Formulas
Final pay plans base benefits on average earnings during a specified number of
years at the end of a participant's career, when earnings are highest. The benefit equals a
percentage of the participant's final average earnings, multiplied by the number of years
of service. This formula provides inflation protection to the participant but can represent
a higher cost to the employer. [Ref. 25, p. 56]
4. Defined Benefit Plans in the Public Sector
There are many differences between public and private sector defined benefit
plans. In many public plans, employers are required to contribute toward the cost of the
plan and cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) are prevalent. Fewer private plans include
such features. Also, more public-sector employees are likely to be covered by a defined
benefit plan than private-sector employees in organizations employing 100 or more
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workers. According to surveys by the U.S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS), 91 percent of state and local government employees participated in a
defined benefit plan in 1994. This compared to 56 percent of private-sector employees in
medium and large private establishments. Additionally, according to the U.S. Office of
Personnel Management. 90 percent of all federal employees were covered by defined
benefit pension plans. [Ref. 25, p. 377]
C. DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS
In a defined contribution plan, the employer makes specified contributions to an
employee's account and, on termination of employment, the employee is entitled to the
value of the vested part of the account. Thus, a defined contribution plan requires the
establishment of an individual account for each employee, because it is funded through
contributions made by and on behalf of each participating employee. In general, annual
additions to defined contribution plans may not exceed the lesser of 25 percent of an
employee's annual compensation or $30,000. Annual additions include employer
contributions, employee contributions, and forfeitures. [Ref. 23, p. 47]
Employee contributions to most plans are provided to both increase retirement
savings and reduce employer's plan costs. Tax law imposes limits on both the mandatory
and voluntary amount employees contribute to qualified plans. These restrictions are
aimed at eliminating the risk that contribution requirements will result in prohibited
patterns of discrimination. If, for example, an employee's contribution requirements
were particularly burdensome, they could indirectly exclude low-income individuals from
participating. Also, the limits on voluntary contribution are aimed at preventing a
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qualified plan from offering excessive benefits to highly compensated employees in the
form of tax-deferred savings accounts. [Ref. 23, p. 49]
There are several types of defined contribution plans. Money purchase plans are
plans where employer contributions are made based on a percentage of an employee's
salary. Target benefit plans seek to achieve a certain retirement benefit. Additional
classifications include profit sharing 401(k)), thrift, stock bonus, and employee stock
ownership plans (ESOPs). The maximum deductible contribution to profit sharing and
stock bonus plans is limited by law to 15 percent of the compensation of all participants.
[Ref. 23, p. 47] Specific characteristics of each plan are provided below.
1. Section 401(k)
The Revenue Act of 1978 authorized cash or deferred arrangements under section
401(k). Under this plan an employee may elect to have a portion of compensation
contributed to a qualified profit sharing or stock bonus plan. These contributions are not
treated as distributed or available (taxable) income to the employee but as deductible
employer contributions to the plan. Section 401(k) plans have achieved considerable
popularity since 1981, when the IRS published regulations clarifying their use and
benefits. 401(k) contributions and deductions are governed by the same rules as other
defined contribution plans except that the maximum employee elective contribution
cannot exceed a specified dollar limitation, adjusted for the cost of living. The maximum
contribution to such plans was $9,500 in 1998. [Ref. 22, p. 58] Changes made in The
Revenue Act of 1986 (TRA'86) prohibit nonprofit organizations formed after July 2,
1986 and state or local governments formed after May 6, 1986 from maintaining such a
plan. [Ref. 23, p. 51]
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As a result of increasing participation in 401(k) plans, organizations are better
able to determine worker participation and decision making in 401(k) plans. Data from
the Employees Benefits Research Institute suggests that there are different factors that
individuals use in determining contribution amount to these plans. The most common
factors are shown in Figure 4-1
.
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Figure 4-1
Source: EBRI Databook on Employees Benefits, 1997
Five major and minor factors explain why individuals do not contribute to these
plans. Figure 4-2 shows the major and minor reasons for personnel deciding not to
contribute. These figures are based on an EBRI survey that examined worker decision
making in 401(k) plans. [Ref. 26, p. 1 15]
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Figure 4-2
Source: EBRI Databook on Employees Benefits, 1 997
2. Section 403 (b)
A special type of tax-deferred retirement plan under section 403 (b) is available to
certain nonprofit organization and public schools. Effective in 1989, such tax deferred
annuities (TDAs) must satisfy, with respect to contributions not made pursuant to salary-
reduction, essentially the same participation rules as 401 (k) plans. In addition, special '
nondiscrimination rules apply to elective contributions made by employees through
salary deferrals. Annual contributions to a TDA cannot exceed a maximum limit referred
to as an exclusion allowance. The exclusion allowance is generally equal to 20 percent of
the employee's taxable compensation from the employer multiplied by the number of the
employee's years of service with that employer, reduced by amounts already paid by the
employer to purchase the annuity. Additionally, there is a limit imposed by the exclusion
allowance on employee contributions made through salary reduction of $9,500 annually.
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If an employee is required to contribute a set percentage of compensation to a TDA as a
condition of employment, the contribution does not count toward the annual limit. [Ref.
23. p. 51]
3. Section 457
This section contains rules applicable to deferred compensation plans of state and
local governments and agencies. Deferred compensation plans for employees of tax-
exempt organizations were made subject to section 457 by provisions of TRA '86.
Amounts of compensation deferred under a section 457 deferred compensation plan are
not taxed to income when received. It is required that these deferred compensation plans
be offered to all employees on a nondiscriminatory basis. Under section 457, the
amounts deferred are limited to no more than one-third of taxable income compensation
or $7,500, whichever is less. Any amount being deferred under a section 403(b) plan
must be included in determining whether the overall $7,500 limit has been exceeded.
[Ref 23, p. 51-52]
4. Section 414(h) (2)
Another arrangement under which pension plan participants may defer taxable
income is by contributing to a pension plan, available only to public employees, called a
"employer pickup." Under retirement plans maintained by a state or political
subdivision, section 414(h) (2) provides that the employing unit may "pick up"
contributions that have been designated by the plan as employee contributions. When
such contributions are picked up, they are treated as if they were made by the employer
and not the employee. 'Ticked up" employee contributions are not currently taxable as
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income to the employee but are instead taxed later when received as pension income.
[Ref. 23, p. 52]
Amounts of employee contributions under an employer pick-up must be
accounted for in determining exclusion allowances and setting amounts that may be tax
deferred through section 403 (b) tax-deferred annuities. However, the overall limit of
$9,500 for elective deferrals under tax-deferred annuities is not reduced by an employer
pickup. Public employee, state teacher, or university retirement systems in at least 1
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states currently use pick-up plans. [Ref. 23, p. 52]
5. Simplified Employee Pensions
Simplified Employee Pensions (SEPs) are employer-sponsored plans that have
similar features to IRAs. Under a SEP, the employer contribution is limited to 1 5 percent
of compensation or $7,500, whichever is less. [Ref. 20, p. 126] It includes amounts that
employees elect to contribute through salary deferrals. An employer may contribute to a
SEP in addition to contributing to other qualified pension plans, but the SEP contribution
will count in the total deductible limit on employer contributions to all qualified plans.
[Ref. 23, p.53]
The employer contribution is invested in a retirement account for the individual
employee. Amounts contributed to a SEP by an employer on behalf of an employee and
elective salary deferrals are excludable from the employee's gross taxable income.
Contributions and earnings in the SEP accumulate tax free until withdrawn. Employees
are fully and immediately vested in the employer's contributions and the investment
earnings from the contributions. [Ref. 23, p. 53]
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TRA '86 expanded employee participation in a SEP by providing a salary
reduction option, available to employees in firms with fewer than 25 workers, if 50
percent of eligible workers participate. The maximum deferral for 1993 was $8,994.
reduced by any salary reduction contributions to a 401 (k) or 403 (b) plan. Also, a
special non-discrimination test restricts highly compensated personnel from deferring
more than 125 percent of the average deferral percentage for all other eligible employees.
[Ref. 23, p. 53]
SEP plans must allow employees to withdraw contributions at any time, and
continued employer contributions may not be conditioned on any employer contributions
remaining in the account. Earnings accumulated on employer contributions are not taxed
to the employee until distributed. Additionally, SEPs are subject to the same penalties on
premature withdrawals as IRAs. Finally, employees covered under a SEP cannot make
fully deductible contributions to his or her own IRA unless his or her adjusted gross
income falls below $25,000 (single) or $40,000 (married). [Ref. 23, p. 53]
6. Participants in More than One Plan
In addition to limiting contributions to separate plans, section 415 (e) imposes
further contribution limitations when an employee participates in both a defined benefit
and a defined contribution plan sponsored by the same employer. Section 404 (j) denies
deductions for amounts contributed to the fund in excess of the prescribed limits. In
general, section 415 (e) states that if a participant is covered by both a defined benefit
plan and a defined contribution plan by the same employer, the sum of the plan's
fractions cannot exceed 1 .0. [Ref. 23, p. 47] It restricts participants' tax deductions to a
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certain percentage of contributions made to each plan. The fraction is figured using
guidance provided in the tax code.
D. INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS (IRAs)
IRAs were established by ERISA in 1974. In establishing IRAs. Congress
intended to offer workers who did not have employer sponsored pension coverage an
opportunity to save tax-deferred compensation for retirement use. The 1981 Economic
Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) extended the availability of IRAs to all employees. TRA '86
retained tax-deductible IRAs for those who are not "active participants" in employer-
sponsored plans but restricted or eliminated the tax deduction for individuals in a
employer-sponsored retirement plan with income above a specified level. [Ref 22, p.
163]
TRA' 86 also added two new categories of IRA contributions: nondeductible
contributions, which accumulate tax-free until distributed, and partially deductible
contributions, which are deductible up to an amount less than the maximum allowable
$2000. While TRA '86 made IRAs less advantageous for some, most individuals may
contribute the maximum amount and deduct some or all of their contribution. For all
individuals, IRA's remain a tax-effective way to save for retirement. [Ref. 22, p. 163]
1. Eligibility (Traditional IRA)
Under a traditional IRA, a single worker can contribute and deduct from gross
income up to $2,000 per year if he or she is not an active participant in a company
sponsored retirement plan and has an adjusted gross income (AGI) of less than $25,000.
Deductible contributions are phased out for AGI between $25,000 and $35,000.
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Nondeductible contributions are allowed for the balance of the $2,000 maximum limit.
[Ref. 22, p. 164]
Where a husband and wife both earn income, each may contribute up to $2,000 of
earned income per year. A two income couple can therefore make contributions of up to
$4,000 per year. If a husband and wife file a joint return and either spouse is covered by
an employer-sponsored plan, both are restricted in their eligibility to make deductible
IRA contributions. They are each allowed fully deductible contributions of $2,000 each
if their adjusted gross income is below $40,000. Deductible contributions are phased out
for a combined AGI between $40,000 and $50,000, and nondeductible contributions may
make up the remainder of the $2,000 ($4,000 if married) balance. A $2,000
nondeductible contribution is allowed for working spouses if their combined AGI is
greater than $50,000. The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 increased the
amount that an individual may contribute to a joint IRA for the individual and a non-
working spouse from $2,250 to $4,000, annually. The new limit is equal to the maximum
contribution allowable if both spouses work. [Ref. 22, pp. 164-165]
2. Contributions and Distributions (Traditional IRA)
An employer can contribute to an IRA on behalf of an employee or also offer
employee IRAs through payroll deduction arrangements. The law also permits
individuals to roll over distributions of total or partial account balances from: (1) one IRA
to another and (2) a qualified employer plan to an IRA. The transfer of assets from one
account to another must be completed within 60 days. [Ref. 22, p. 168]
If an individual receives a distribution from an IRA comprised of deductible
contributions and earnings, the entire amount of the distribution is included in gross
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income and subject to tax. If an individual receives a distribution comprised in part of
previously taxed nondeductible contributions, the amount of the distribution that
represents nondeductible contributions is excluded from gross income. If an individual
receives distributions from an IRA prior to age 59 Vi, a 10 percent penalty is imposed on
the amount of the distribution included in gross income. [Ref. 22, p. 170]
Like any financial arrangement, IRAs require careful planning and monitoring.
Because their ultimate purpose is to provide retirement income, investments need to be
directed toward long-term return. IRAs can be an important addition to retirement
savings opportunities. They are particularly useful for individuals who do not have
employer pension coverage and for highly mobile workers with minimal or no pension
benefits due to limited service in any one job. The amount of retirement income
generated by an IRA depends on contribution amounts, age when the IRA is established,
rate of investment return, and retirement age.
3. Roth IRA
In August 1997, President Clinton signed into law the Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997, which contains provisions creating what are called Roth IRAs, after Senator
William Roth, the sponsor of this provision of the Act. The new law allows more
Americans than ever before to save through a tax deferred IRA. Under the Act, certain
penalty free withdrawals from a Roth IRA may be made immediately after conversion.
The Act also allows for higher income eligibility limits. Specifically, contributions to a
Roth IRA aren't tax-deductible and earnings can grow tax-free. Also allowed are penalty
and tax-free withdrawal of earnings before five years if you are at least 59 Vi or for a first
home purchase, higher education, medical expenses, death, or disability. Also,
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distributions from a Roth IRA are not required at age 70 14. Finally, you can continue to
make contributions after age 70 Vi if you have compensation. [Ref. 24, P. 8-10] The
requirements for and benefits from investment in a Roth IRA for military members will
be discussed in Chapter V.
E. PENSION PLAN ROLLOVERS
The rules on rollovers changed effective January 1, 1993. Under new law, a total
or partial distribution of the balance to the credit of the employee under a qualified plan
may be rolled over tax-free to another qualified plan or IRA. The exception to this rule is
if the distribution is one of a series of substantially equal payments made (1) over the life
of the participant or (2) over a period of 10 years or more. Like IRAs. the transfer must
be made within 60 days of the participant's receipt of the distribution from the first plan.
A qualified retirement or annuity plan must allow participants to transfer any
distributions that are eligible for rollover to another qualified plan or IRA. [Ref. 23. p.
56]
F. TAX CONSIDERATIONS IN PRIVATE PENSION PLANS
The statutory tax treatment of pensions was formally legislated through the
Revenue Act of 1 92 1 , which exempted interest income of stock-bonus and profit-sharing
plans from current taxation and deferred employee tax payments until distribution.
Statutes enacted since 1 92 1 have permitted employers to deduct a reasonable amount in
excess of the amount necessary to fund pension liabilities (1928); made pension trusts
irrevocable (1938); and established nondiscriminatory eligibility rules for pension
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coverage, contributions, and benefits (1942). These provisions were incorporated into the
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) of 1954 and, along with major modifications under the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 (TRA '86), constitute the basic rules governing taxation of pension
plans. [Ref. 25. p. 55]
The tax treatment of qualified pension plans provides incentives both for
employers to establish such plans and for employees to participate in them. In general a
contribution to a qualified plan is immediately deductible in computing employers' taxes
but only becomes taxable to the employee upon distribution. Subsequent earnings on the
contribution are not subject to tax. This tax treatment is contingent on the employer's
compliance with rules set out in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) and administered by the U.S Department of Treasury and the U.S. Department
of Labor. [Ref. 25, p. 55]
G. SPONSORSHIP, PARTICIPATION, AND VESTING IN PENSION PLANS
Individuals who work for an employer that sponsors a retirement plan will receive
retirement income from that plan provided they meet the plan's age and service
requirements for participation and vesting. Examination of the demographic and work-
related characteristics of those employees who work for an employer where a plan was
sponsored for any of the employees, participate in a plan, and are vested in such plans
provides insight into who will benefit from pension income in their retirement.
According to EBRI tabulations of the April 1993 Current Population Survey
(CPS) employee benefit supplement, 62.1 percent of all civilian nonagricultural wage and
salary workers aged 1 6 and over were working for an employer where a retirement plan
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was sponsored. In 1993, 75.9 percent of those workers working for an employer where a
retirement plan was sponsored participated in the plan. Thus 47.1 percent of all
nonagricultural wage and salary workers actually participated in an employment-based
retirement plan. A worker becomes vested in a plan generally only after working for the
sponsoring employer for a minimum number of years. In 1993, 85.5 percent of those
workers participating in an employment-based plan were vested in that plan and 40.3
percent of all workers were vested in a plan. [Ref. 23, p. 29]
H. FEDERAL EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM
In the early 1980's, the Congress began to consider a new retirement system for
federal employees, mostly because they felt that the existing Civil Service Retirement
System (CSRS) was too costly. New legislation enacted in 1983 extended Social
Security to federal employees hired after December 31, 1983, and established the Federal
Employees Retirement System (FERS), modeled after private sector plans. Under FERS,
retirees receive benefits from three sources: Social Security, a federal government
annuity, and Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) distributions. Congressional policymakers were
concerned that retirement benefits under FERS should be comparable with benefits under
CSRS and enable employees to maintain their standard of living after retirement. [Ref.
27, p. 3]
The basic FERS annuity is similar to CSRS in that it guarantees a specific
monthly retirement benefit based on age, length of service, and the average of the highest
3 consecutive years salaries. However, the benefit credit formula for the FERS annuity-
credits each year of service at one percent, while CSRS service credits range from 1 .5 to
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2 percent per year of service. Additionally, cost-of-living adjustments under FERS are
lower and not provided before age 62. [Ref. 27, p. 3]
Pension professionals believe that to maintain roughly the same standard of living
after retirement, individuals' income needs range from 60 to 80 percent of pre-retirement
pretax income adjusted for inflation. Typically retirees pay lower taxes, do not have
work related expenses, may not have dependent children, and probably have their
mortgage paid. [Ref. 27, p. 3]
As of 1 994, 942,000 FERS-covered employees (76 percent) were voluntarily
contributing an average of 5.7 percent of their salaries to TSP. Most of the remaining
300,000 FERS employees who were not contributing were in lower pay brackets. Lower
paid workers, who were contributing, contributed on average 4.4 percent of their salaries.
[Ref. 27, p. 2]
1. FERS Eligibility
Under FERS, employees are automatically enrolled in TSP because federal
agencies are required to contribute to the plan an amount equal to 1 percent of each
employee's salary. In addition, employees can make voluntary contributions up to 10
percent of their basic pay: agencies match the first 3 percent on a dollar-for-dollar basis
and the next 2 percent at 50 cents to a dollar, for a total agency contribution of 5 percent.
Any additional employee contributions are not matched, but all contributions constitute
before-tax savings and earnings on all contributions grow tax deferred. All employee
contributions are limited to a statutory inflation-adjusted cap, which was $10,000 in
1996. [Ref. 28, p. 2]
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2. Investment Options
TSP contributions can be invested in a federal government securities fund (G
fund), a commercial bond fund (F fund), or a commercial large capitalization stock fund
(C fund). The C and F funds are index funds that invest in securities in the stock and
bond markets. Initially. TSP's law restricted the amounts that could be invested in the C
and F funds through 1990. However, the restriction was lifted 1991 and contributions to
these funds have increased since then. Also, plan participants can transfer any portion of
their account balance among the three funds. [Ref. 28, p. 3]
a. Government Securities Investment (G) Fund
The G Fund consists of investments in short-term non-marketable U.S.
Treasury securities specially issued to the Thrift Savings Plan. All investments in the G
Fund earn interest at a rate that is equal to the average of market rates of return on U.S.
Treasury marketable securities outstanding with 4 or more years to maturity. There is no
risk for G Fund securities since they are guaranteed by the Government. [Ref. 28, p. 3]
b. Common Stock Index Investment (C) Fund
The C Fund is invested in a Standard & Poor's 500 (S & P 500) stock
index fund, that is made up of the common stocks of all of the companies represented in
the S & P 500 index. The C Fund gives participants the opportunity to diversify their
investments by investing broadly in the U. S. stock markets and to earn the relatively
high investment returns stocks have historically returned over long periods of time. The
risk of investing in the C Fund is that the value of stocks can decline sharply, resulting in
losses. [Ref. 28, p. 3]
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c. Fixed Income Index Investment (F) Fund
The F Fund is invested in a bond index fund that tracks the performance of
the Lehman Brothers Aggregate (LBA) bond index. The bond index consists primarily of
high quality fixed-income securities representing the U.S. Government, private
corporations, and mortgage-backed securities sectors of the U.S. bond market. The F
Fund offers the opportunity for increased rates of return in periods of generally declining
interest rates. The F Fund carries credit risk and market risk and, thus, has potential for
negative returns that can result in losses. [Ref. 28, p. 3]
3. Vesting Requirements
When separating from Federal service, employees must meet the Thrift Savings
Plan vesting requirement to be entitled to Agency Automatic ( 1 percent) Contributions
and associated earnings. For most employees, the vesting requirement is 3 years of
Federal service. Congressional employees and certain other non-career employees must
complete two year of service. Employees who die in service are automatically vested in
their Agency Automatic Contributions. Employees are immediately vested in their own
contributions and in the earning attributable to those contributions. [Ref. 28, p. 2]
4. Contributing to TSP
To begin contributing to the Thrift Savings Plan, individuals must complete an
Election Form (TSP-1) and submit it to their agency employment office during a TSP
open season. The two open seasons each year are from May 15 to July 31 and November
1 5 to January 3 1 . [Ref. 28, p. 4]
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5. Tax Advantages
There are two major tax advantages to the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP). First, all
TSP contributions are tax deductible. Second, individuals do not pay current federal
income taxes on the earnings received in their TSP account balance. Most states allow
the same pre-tax and tax deferred savings on their income taxes. These tax advantages
continue until retirement. If employees leave Federal service before becoming eligible
for retirement, they may transfer account balances to Individual Retirement Accounts or
other eligible retirement plans. This will allow them to continue to defer taxes. It should
be noted that amounts transferred to a Roth IRA are taxed identically to rollovers from
traditional to Roth IRAs. These tax implications will be addressed in the next chapter.
[Ref. 28, p. 3]
6. Withdrawal Options
The Thrift Savings Plan is a long-term plan for retirement savings with special tax
advantages. Generally, individuals cannot withdraw amounts until they separate from
federal service. Individuals may borrow from their contributions to purchase a primary
residence or for general purposes. However, interest on the loan accumulates at the G
Fund rate in effect at the time of receipt of the loan application. [Ref. 28, p. 4]
After separation from federal service, there are three ways for individuals to
withdraw from their accounts. First, they can have the TSP purchase a lifetime annuity.
Second, they can receive the balance in their account in a lump sum. Finally, they can
elect to receive monthly payments. Also, if individuals do not want to withdraw from
their account when they leave federal service, they can leave their entire account balance
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in the TSP until age 70 54. Individuals must begin receiving monthly or annuity
payments by April 1 of the year following the year they reach age 70 Vz. [Ref. 28, p. 4]
As of January' 1995, TSP contributions and earnings were invested as shown in
Table 4-1.
Table 4-1
Accumulated TSP Contributions and Earnings (1995)
(Dollars in billions)
Investment Amount Percent
G Fund $26.9 40
C Fund $36.7 55
F Fund $ 3.3 5
Total $66.6 100
Source: Federal Retirement T irift Investment Board, Thrift Savings Plan Hishlishts.
http://www.tsp.gov, May 1998.
7. Average Annual Returns
TSP's three funds have had relatively high average annual rates of return since
1987. The C fund has averaged 17.5 percent and the F and G funds' average have been
8.5 percent and 7.6 percent respectively. [Ref. 28, p. 1] From August 1997 through
August 1998 the funds have returned 19.14 percent (C Fund), 7.84 percent (F Fund) and
6.21 percent (G Fund). [Ref. 29, p. 1] The C and F funds have also been more volatile
than the G fund. The higher returns available from the C fund also involve somewhat
higher risks inherent in stocks. Thus, the retirement income provided by the TSP
depends on how much individuals contribute and the risk that they are willing to
undertake. Because returns and risks are related, the ability to diversify investments
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among stocks and bonds is an important factor for participants in a program such as TSP
because it allows them to tailor their investments to reflect the level of risk they are
willing to take. [Ref 27, p. 6] The trends and returns for each fund are shown in figure
4-3.
C, F, and G Fund Annual Returns
January 1988 - December 1997
1988 - 1997 Compound Annual Return
C Fund = 17.5%
F Fund = 8.5%
G Fund s 7.6%
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Figure 4-3
Source: U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Federal Employees Retirement System .
http://www.tsp.gov, 1998.
I. FERS FUND COMPARISON
A member contributing $2,000 annually, at the beginning of each year, to the C,
F, or G fund from the funds' inception in 1987 until 1997 would have accumulated
$58,315.05, $31,920.02, and $29,920.71 respectively from their own contributions. If the
employee's annual salary was $40,000, a $2,000 annual TSP contribution would equal 5
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percent of annual pay and be eligible for a 5 percent matching contribution. The
matching contribution would provide additional savings equal to the savings from
contributed amounts plus any earnings. The cumulated return is shown in table 4-2.
Table 4-2
C, F. and G Fund Return on Annual Contribution of $2000














































































Source: Adapted from Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board, Thrift Savings Plan
Highlights , http://www.tsp.gov, May 1998.
Table 4-3 summarizes the total benefit at age 60 from a TSP for an employee who
has invested $2,000 in any of the funds since its inception in 1987. It assumes rates of
returns based on historical data from each fund's performance since their inception in
1987. It also assumes that individuals will continue to contribute $2,000 per year until
age 60 and annual matching contributions will total $2,000.00 until age 60. Assuming an
average annual inflation rate of 3 percent, the total value of the funds in present dollars
will be: $3,743,569.78 (C Fund), $384,394.34 (F Fund), and $310,397.40 (G Fund).
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Table 4-3
Total Value of Investment at Age 60 with 35 Years of Service (Historical Return)



















Age 25-35 at Age 60
$3,286,452.24 $245,361.59 $186,757.75
Total Value of TSP at
age 60
$7,838,203.78 $805,394.34 $649,397.40
Source: Adapted from Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board, Thrift Savings Plan
Highlights , http://www.tsp.gov, May 1998.
Because the average rates of return for the period from 1987-1997 were
considered to be higher than normal, more conservative rates of return would most likely
be a better indicator of future returns for TSP participants. Table 4-4 summarizes the total
benefit from TSP for a 35 year-old employee who has invested $2,000 in either fund
since its inception in 1987. It assumes more conservative rates of returns of 10 percent
for the C Fund (S&P 500 Index average since 1941), and 7 and 6 percent respectively for
the F and G Funds (discount rates from OMB Circular No. A-94). It also assumes that
individual will continue to contribute $2000 per year until age 60 and that matching
contributions will total $2,000 annually until age 60. Assuming an average annual
inflation rate of 3 percent, the total value of the funds in present dollars will be:
$791,412.05 (C Fund), $286,316.74 (F Fund), and $227,478.60 (G Fund).
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Table 4-4
Total Value of Investment at Age 60 with 35 Years of Service (Conservative Return)



















Age 25-35 at Age 60
$631,826.42 $173,243.76 $128,415.82
Total Value of TSP at
age 60
$1,657,041.08 $599,483.68 $476,289.68
In May 1995, TSP's Board considered adding two additional investment options:
an indexed domestic small capitalization equity fund and an indexed international equity
fund. The Board selected these funds because the new funds would add diversity and
provide the opportunity for greater returns than the current options though at slightly
higher risks. . [Ref 27, p. 10] It is expected that the two new investment funds will be
available to TSP participants in May 2000. [Ref. 30, p. 4]
The Small Capitalization Stock Index Investment (S) Fund will track the Wilshire
4500 index, which includes all common stocks actively traded in the U.S. stock markets
except stocks included in the S&P 500 index of stocks. The International Stock Index
Investment (I) Fund will track the Morgan Stanley EAFA index, which covers
approximately 60 percent of the stock markets in Europe, Australia, and the Far East.
[Ref. 30, p. 4] Adding the two funds will make TSP's number of investment options and
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mix more like private sector section 401 (k) plans. On average, most private sector
section 401(k) plans offer four or more investment options that include a number of bond
and stock funds. [Ref 27. p. 10]
Note that the TSP analysis presented above is conservative in that it assumes
constant contributions and matching funds totaling $4,000.00 per year. However, over
the next 25 to 30 years it should be expected that income levels will rise, creating
opportunity among individual investors for additional savings. Also, Federal Reserve
Board Chairman Allan Greenspan has often referred to economic events in the early and
mid 1990's as irrationally exuberant and unsustainable. Table 4-5 provides evidence of
the strong economic climate of the past decade. Specifically, it identifies the three
indexes used by the TSP Board to measure the success of each of the three funds.
Table 4-5
Index Returns (1987-1997)
















































Total 173.93% 121.99% 104.78%
Average Return 15.81% 1 1 .09% 9.53%
Source: U.S. Office
http://www.tsp.gov,





V. NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT INVESTING
A. RETIREMENT SAVINGS
The fact that savings rates in the U. S. have declined during the past several
decades is well known, yet the causes of the decline are subject to debate. A study by the
Congressional Budget Office in 1 993 found that the government sector accounted for
approximately two-thirds of the decline in national savings, while the commercial sector
accounted for only one-third. The study indicates that the decline in personal savings
rates has contributed least to the decline in the overall U. S. savings rate. [Ref. 51, p. xiv]
Although only a small portion of the decline in savings can be attributed to a
decrease in personal savings, it is true that personal saving rates have declined since the
1940's. From 1947 to 1996, personal savings as a percentage of disposable income
peaked in 1973 and 1974 at 9.3 percent and neared that peak again in 1981. However,
personal saving as a percentage of disposable income has declined overall since 1 949,
reaching its lowest point since 1949 in 1994 at 3.8 percent. [Ref. 26, p. 71] Appendix B
shows U. S. personal savings rates for the period from 1929 through 1996. Figure 5-1
shows the trend in savings from Appendix B.
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Source: Adapted from EBRI Databook on Employee Benefits, 1997.
1. Future Consequences of a Low Saving Rate
As the United States population ages and grows in number, the persistence of low
personal saving rates since the late 1940's may be problematic for two reasons. First,
from a personal finance standpoint, when workers save money today, they do so with the
expectation of having sufficient income and assets in retirement and therefore need to
rely less on Social Security, public assistance, or family help. Second, from a national
macroeconomic view, when personal income is saved today, it can be used by businesses
for capital investment and to promote economic growth. If economic growth increases,
we are more likely to see higher per capita real Gross Domestic Product by the time baby
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boomers retire. This translates into more wealth per person to support an unprecedented
proportion of retirees. [Ref. 26, p. 71]
2. Reasons for Declining Saving Rates
There are many factors that have led to a decline in the personal savings rate, and
economists disagree to the extent to which each may have contributed. Some argue that
in the 1980's the boom in real estate and stock market investing caused people to invest
more and save less in pursuit of increased wealth. The resultant increases in wealth
translate into greater consumer confidence, which encourages more individual investing
and lowers individual's propensity to save. Others argue that increases in consumer
credit and home equity loans have caused people to assume less of a need for savings for
future use. Critics note that increased consumer product campaigns have encouraged a
more consumption-oriented culture. Finally, personal savings rates may have declined
because the percentage of persons between age 45 and 65 (the group thought to save the
most) has decreased, while the percentage of persons over 65 years of age (the group
thought to save the least) has increased. To the extent that pure demographics contribute
to the decline, the continued aging of the population in the future will only exacerbate
this trend. [Ref. 26, p. 72]
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, the Savings and Investment Act of 1997, and
the Retirement Income, Security, and Savings Act of 1997 include provisions that amend
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to encourage savings and individual retirement
accounts, to provide pension security, portability, and simplification. Tax incentives
have encouraged individuals to contribute to retirement plans and employers to sponsor
them. Retirement saving has become an increasing percentage of all personal saving. In
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fact, net personal savings as a percentage of disposable income was lower than total
retirement plan savings as a percentage of disposable income in 1993 because of
dissaving in other areas. Approximately 24.9 percent of the average household's $22,428
in assets in 1 996 came from assets held in defined benefit and defined contribution plans.
[Ref. 26. p. 72]
Clearly, individuals have taken advantage of tax incentives by participating in and
contributing to retirement plans. The extent to which increased use of tax-favored
retirement plans affects the total personal savings rate is debatable. It is argued that
"Little, if any, of the overall contributions to existing saving incentives such as IRAs and
401(k)s have raised saving," [Ref. 26, p. 72] and that additional saving in one area is
offset by spending or borrowing in another. Although 62 percent of pre-retirees polled
by the Retirement Confidence Survey (RCS) reported being confident of having enough
money to live comfortably through their retirement years, only 24 percent have tried to
determine how much they actually need to save. [Ref. 26, p. 72]
Understanding individual choices about spending and saving alternatives involves
a combination of psychological, educational, and economic factors that are difficult to
isolate. The relationship between psychology, education, and personal finance on the
decision to save for retirement is a relatively new area of inquiry that promises to attract
increasing interest both in the private and public sectors. It is possible that the
Department of Defense could use savings and retirement plans that have been
successfully used outside of the military to benefit the men and women in the armed
services, while providing incentives for recruiting and retention. Before implementing
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any such plans in DoD, however, the costs, practicality, and future benefits of such
changes should be closely examined.
B. THRIFT SAVINGS PLAN
The recent success of the Thrift Savings Plan in the Federal Employment
Retirement System has focused attention on the fact that all federal employees with the
exception of military personnel are eligible to benefit. Since the TSP was introduced to
the federal branch of government in the 1980's, military members have questioned the
policy of excluding them from this program. In fact, military personnel experienced a
reduction in future retirement benefits in the mid-1980s, when other federal employees
began enjoying the benefits of the TSP. Approximately 10 years later, Congress has
begun to wrestle with this disparity and to consider options to allow active members of
the armed forces to participate in the tax-deferred savings plan for civilian employees, as
described below.
1. The Proposed Military TSP
Under a bill (H.R. 3933) proposed by Representatives John Mica and Owen
Pickett, military members would be able to contribute up to 5 percent of their basic pay to
the Thrift Savings Plan. Taxes on contributions and investment earnings would be
deferred until they are withdrawn. [Ref. 31, p. 2] Representative Mica, Chairman of the
House Sub-Committee on Civil Service, said uthe bill will provide a low cost tool for
dealing with recruiting and retaining qualified personnel.
7
' [Ref. 32, p. 1]
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Service men and women will be able to build up substantial
savings over time without squeezing the already scarce resources of the
Defense Department. This will ease the financial pressures that too
frequently force dedicated men and women to abandon a military career in
search of greener pastures. [Ref. 32, p. 1]
"The men and women who fight our nation's battles and preserve the peace are no
less deserving of this excellent opportunity to save for their future than their civilian
counterpart." [Ref. 32, p. 1] Pickett said. According to Navy estimates, a service
member who contributes only $50 a month from age 19 to 39 would accumulate over
$400,000 in savings by age 59, assuming an average rate of return of 10.5 percent. [Ref.
32, p. 1]
Analysis of the TSP proposal for military personnel reveals that it would be an
additional benefit to military personnel in that, assuming personnel make maximum
contributions to such a plan, five percent of an individual's pay would be shielded from
taxation. This would be more advantageous than investing five percent in a mutual fund
because any earnings from a TSP would not be subject to a capital gains tax.
Table 5-1 shows projected TSP savings for a typical 0-5 and E-7 respectively with
twenty years of service. It is based on the figures presented in Appendices C. D and E.
Appendix C presents data on basic pay costs and maximum TSP contributions assuming
a limit of five percent. Appendix D illustrates future basic pay rates based on annual cost
of living adjustments of three percent. Appendix E presents the average age of
promotion for each rank.
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Table 5-1
Estimated Savings from a Military TSP for a Typical Officer and Enlisted Retiree
Officer (0-5) Enlisted (E-7)
Year Annual pay Maximum Value at the Annual Pay Maximum Value at the
Contribution end of 20
year period
Contribution end of 20
year period
1 $24,280.46 $1,214.02 $7424.84 $11,549.69 $577.48 $3,531.82
2 $25,008.87 $1,250.44 $6952.34 $12,772.40 $638.62 $3,550.67
5 $25,759.14 $1,287.96 $6509.96 $14,233.42 $711.67 $3,597.11
4 $35,147.53 $1,757.38 $8075.11 $14,660.42 $733.02 $3,368.21
5 $36,201.96 $1,810.10 $7561.24 $17,712.20 $885.61 $3,699.41
6 $45,884.30 $2,294.22 $8712.30 $18,243.57 $912.18 $3,464.00
7 $47,260.83 $2,363.04 $8157.85 $18,790.87 $939.54 $3,243.55
8 $48,678.65 $2,433.93 $7638.71 $23,564.84 $1,178.24 $3,697.82
9 $50,139.01 $2,506.95 $7152.62 $24,271.78 $1,213.59 $3,462.51
10 $51,643.18 $2,582.16 $6697.46 $24,999.94 $1,250.00 $3,242.18
11 $64,017.73 $3,200.89 $7547.53 $25,749.94 $1,287.50 $3,035.86
12 $65,938.26 $3,296.91 $7067.22 $32,387.25 $1,619.36 $3,471.24
13 $67,916.40 $3,395.82 $6617.49 $33,358.87 $1,667.94 $3,250.34
14 $69,953.90 $3,497.70 $6196.39 $34,359.64 $1,717.98 $3,043.51
15 $72,052.51 $3,602.63 $5802.07 $41,663.85 $2,083.19 $3,355.00
16 $91,139.93 $4,557.00 $6671.90 $42,913.76 $2,145.69 $3,141.50
17 $93,874.12 $4,693.71 $6247.33 $44,201.17 $2,210.06 $2,941.59
18 $96,690.35 $4,834.52 $5849.65 $45,527.21 $2,276.36 $2,754.40
19 $99,591.06 $4,979.55 $5477.51 $46,893.02 $2,344.65 $2,579.12
20 $102,578.79 $5,128.94 $5128.94 $48,299.82 $2,414.99 $2,414.99
Sum $137,488.46 Sum $64,844.83
Value at Age $764,424.47 Value at Age $527,854.74
60 60
This analysis of how a TSP could benefit military members assumes an inflation
rate of 3 percent per year, a 10 percent return on investment, and cost of living
adjustments of 3 percent per year. It also assumes that military members make maximum
contributions of 5 percent. Under such assumptions a typical officer entering the service
as an ensign at age 22, retiring as an 0-5 after 20 years of service would accumulate
approximately $137,488.46 with total contributions of $60,687.85. If contributions were
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left in the plan until age 60. it would accumulate $764,424.47 in savings. In today's
dollars that would be the equivalent of $248,610.83 since inflation will reduce the
purchasing power of money over time.
Under the same return and inflation assumptions presented above, a typical
enlisted person entering the service as an E-l at age 18, retiring as an E-7 after 20 years
of service would accumulate approximately $64,844 with total contributions of $28,807.
If the contributions are left in the plan until age 60, they would accumulate $527,854 in
savings. In today's dollars that would be the equivalent of $152,528.50.
2. Differences Between the Proposed Military TSP and FERS TSP
The one negative aspect of the proposal under H.R. 3933 is that unlike the Federal
Employees Retirement System, it would not provide any government matching funds.
The resolution specifically states that.
No contributions under section 8432(c) shall be made for the
benefit of a member of the armed forces making contributions to the
Thrift Savings Fund under subsection (a). [Ref. 31, p. 2]
The FERS TSP offers matching contributions of up to 5 percent. Also, FERS
employees are allowed to contribute as much as 10 percent of their salaries to the TSP.
[Ref. 30, p. 1] At retirement this will result in significantly more savings for federal
employees under the FERS TSP. A comparison of tables 5-1 and 4-4 reveals that the
FERS TSP would be $892,617 ($1,657,041 -$764,424) more generous for officers and
$1,129,187 ($1,657,041 -$527,854) more generous for enlisted assuming a 10 percent
average return.
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3. Military TSP Considerations
a. Current Retirement System Effects
Supporters of a proposed military style TSP contend that such a system
would be fairer to members who leave the service prior to 20 years. This is contradictory
to what service career force planners have used since before World War II to "pull"
members to commit to 20 years of arduous duty and sacrifice. "The real risk is that, if
you don't treat retirement as a hard-nosed, cold-eyed personnel management tool that
sends the message, if you want the unusual benefit that isn't available to those in civilian
jobs, you have to complete the full 20 years." [Ref. 33, p. 5]
Critics of a 401 (k) style plan for the military argue that the current retirement
system is the best way to force service members with 8 to 1 4 years of service to accept
unappealing assignments and continue for a 20-year career, rather then getting out. If the
"pull" of the 20-year system is reduced by offering a vested plan through a 401(k) plan or
by reducing regular military retirement, mid-level (8-14 years) personnel, whose families
are not thrilled about unappealing duty, may have a greater tendency to get out.
b. Military TSP Contribution Rates
The proportion ofFERS employees contributing to TSP has steadily
increased. However, the degree of voluntary participation in TSP has varied considerably
among salary ranges. In fact, among FERS employees making between $10,000 and
$19,999 annually only 45 percent made contributions to TSP. Of those individuals the
average deferral rate was only 4.4 percent. For employees having annual salaries
between $20,000 and $29,000, 69 percent made contributions to the TSP. The average
deferral rate for those workers was 5.2 percent. [Ref.30, pp. 6-7] Considering the fact
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that the military workforce is younger than its civilian counterpart, these participation
rates suggest that relatively few military personnel would contribute to a plan without
matching funds.
On the surface it seems that a Roth IRA would be a better retirement option if
individuals only contribute 5 percent on average to any plan. This reasoning implies that
the individuals who would benefit from a military TSP with no matching funds would be
individuals whose current income is above $40,000 or save on average more than 5
percent of their total income. Examining junior enlisted wages in Appendix C illustrates
that E-5s and below making maximum contributions to both a Roth IRA and the
proposed military TSP would be contributing in excess of 10 percent of their salaries.
With regard to expendable income this would place most E-5 and below personnel close
to or below the poverty level. If the military were to offer matching funds of 5 percent,
the cost, based on the Navy's 1998 biannual budget estimates for basic pay, would be
approximately $421.5 million annually for the Navy, assuming all individuals received
maximum contributions. However, because of demographics it is most likely that a
majority of young members could not afford to make maximum contributions. Also, if
FERS is any indication, some members would elect to make no contributions at all.
c. Making a Military TSPAttractive
It seems that to make a military style contribution plan as successful as the FERS
TSP has been with respect to contribution rates and participation would require some sort
of matching. Recognizing that the military's current defined benefit plan is somewhat
more generous than the federal employee's plan for those members leaving the service
between 20 and 30 years of service, it is unlikely that the FERS TSP matching
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contribution levels would be approved for a military TSP. Such a plan, with five percent
matching funds, would be quite costly, as noted above.
Military compensation is unique in that its objective is to encourage young
members with potential for greater responsibility to remain in the service. A system of
skewed matching contributions seems appropriate for achieving long term retention goals
by providing extra incentive for members to remain on active duty. This is especially
appropriate in an environment where vesting has become an issue.
For example, a system that matches contributions of one percent for every two
years of service after the first two years of service up to a maximum of five percent,
would provide service members with benefits somewhat similar to FERS employees.
However, since many military members do not continue on active duty after their initial
commitments and matching contributions would be less for individuals with less than
eight years of service, the system would be less costly. In fact, using current Navy
demographics with respect to age, pay-grade, and retention numbers such a system would
cost the Department of the Navy approximately $285.5 million annually. This represents
approximately two thirds of the cost of a system identical to FERS with matching
contributions of five percent. Again total costs would most likely be less since some
members, especially junior personnel, would elect not to participate initially. At most




Effective in 1998. military members are able to benefit from Roth IRAs in the
same manner as their civilian counterparts. Under traditional IRAs, many military
personnel were excluded from the tax advantages associated with IRAs because they
w ere considered to be participating in an employer sponsored pension plan (the Military
Retirement Fund). This most likely discouraged some members from investing in a
traditional IRA. However, historically on average only 30 to 40 percent of officers and
only 10 to 15 percent of enlisted personnel ever receive any benefits from military
retirement. [Ref. 3, p. 176] For those who leave the military prior to twenty years, their
designation as members of a pension plan deprives them of the tax advantages provided
by ERISA. This is contradictory to the intent of Congress when new tax laws aimed at
encouraging individual contributions to Individual Retirement Accounts were passed as
part ofERISA in 1974.
1. Roth IRA Contribution Levels and Eligibility
If an individual participates in an employer's retirement plan in 1998, he or she
can contribute to a Roth IRA if their income is $1 10,000 or less ($160,000 if married
filling jointly). A full contribution of $2,000.00 can be made if income is less than $95.
000 ($150,000 if married filing jointly). If an individual does not qualify for a full
$2,000 contribution to a Roth IRA, he or she can still contribute the difference to a
Traditional IRA. Additionally, if an individual converts some or all of his or her IRA
assets to a new Roth IRA, their earnings grow tax-free if their adjusted gross income
(AGI) is $100,000 or less. While they are required to pay taxes on the amount converted,
there is no 10 percent penalty tax for early withdrawal. Also, during 1998 only, tax
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payments on converted amounts can be spread over a four-year period. [Ref. 34. pp. 6-7]
Eligibility for a Roth IRA is outlined in Figure 5-2.
Roth IRA Eligibility
To be Your adjusted gross income (AGli
eligible for... must be....
A full S2.00C S1 50.000 cr less (if you f.le a jo.nt tax return.'
contribution $95,000 or less (if you fee single)
A partial Between S150.0C0 - 15C.C00
contribution (if you file a joint tax retu'n;
(less than $2,000) Between S95.000 - 110.000
{if you file single)
Figure 5-2
Source: Fidelity Investments, Roth IRA vs. Traditional IRA . 1998
2. IRA Conversion Considerations
The decision to convert from a traditional IRA to a Roth IRA can be complicated.
There are many factors for individuals to consider. First, adjusted gross income should
be less than $100,000. Next, the individual should have 10 or more years to save until
retirement. Also, he or she should have sufficient money, other than IRA contributions,
to pay taxes on the rollover. Finally, the individual should assess whether he or she
expects to be in the same or higher tax bracket when retiring and if they expect to make
withdrawals before or after age 70 lA. Unlike traditional IRAs. a Roth IRA allows
individuals to defer withdrawals until after age 70 14. [Ref. 34, pp. 6-7] Table 5-2
compares the traditional IRA and the new Roth IRA.
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Table 5-2




Under age 70 Vz with
compensation. Married
couples may open an
IRA for a non-working
spouse.
Any age subject to income limits.
Married couples may open an IRA
for a non-working spouse.
Income Limits
Single filers: $95,000 (Full $2,000
contribution)
$95,000-1 10,00 (Partial contribution)











subject to tax upon
withdrawal.
Contributions may be withdrawn tax-




















Yes, higher education, first home





at age 70 XA
No requirement.
Source: Fidelity Investments, Roth IRA vs. Traditional IRA, 1998.
3. Advantages of Investing in a Roth IRA
The advantage of a Roth IRA over a traditional IRA are illustrated in Figure 5-3.
It assumes a $2,000 annual investment at the beginning of each year, a 9 percent average
annual rate of return, and a 28 percent tax bracket at the time of contribution and
distribution. The non-deductible traditional IRA includes after-tax contributions, which
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grow tax-deferred until withdrawn at the end of the specified period. The deductible
traditional IRA includes deductible contributions, which grow tax-deferred until
withdrawn at the end of the specified period. Also, to make a fair comparison with the
non-deductible traditional IRA and the Roth IRA, the deductible traditional IRA value
includes the annual tax savings from each year's contribution which are invested in
taxable investments earning the same return. Earnings are taxed every year and the tax
liability is deducted from the balance. The Roth IRA includes non-deductible
contributions which grow and are distributed tax-free at the end of the specified period.
All values reflect a lump sum distribution at the end of the period net any applicable taxes
and assume no early withdrawal penalties due upon distribution. [Ref. 34, p. 2]
How a Roth IRA Could








Traditional IRA - Nan-deductible









Source: Fidelity Investments. Roth IRA vs. Traditional IRA , 1998
D. INVESTMENT CONSIDERATIONS FOR MILITARY MEMBERS
Recently, there has been a drastic change in investment philosophy for employees
working in the private sector and state and local governments. As mentioned in chapter
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four, the private sector has moved much more toward defined contribution plans. While
local and state governments have maintained some form of defined benefit plan for
employees, the allocation of the financial assets in those plans has been transformed. In
1994 these assets totaled more than $1 trillion, up from $162 billion in 1979. As table 5-
3 shows, pension fund investment has moved toward equities and away from bonds as a
percentage of total assets. Bonds represented the majority of state and local pension fund
investments for 1950 (95 percent) through 1988 (52 percent). [Ref. 26, p. 147]
From 1989 through 1995, bond holdings as a percentage of all state and local
pension fund investments fell from 48 percent to 32 percent. At the same time equity
holdings rose from 39 to 51 percent and other holdings (private mortgages and mortgage-
backed securities, guaranteed investment contracts, mutual funds, and other financial
assets such as real estate, receivables, and physical property) grew from 9 to 1 3 percent.
[Ref. 26, p. 147]
The last decade has proven that military members are at a disadvantage with
respect to realizing gains through defined contribution plans and tax deductible and tax
deferred savings for retirement. Recent reductions in the military retirement system
illustrate that that system is fair game for future budget cuts. Furthermore, it is unlikely
that future retirement benefits will allow service members to enjoy the same lifestyle that
they enjoyed while on active duty without other employment or financial resources. This
is particularly evident as other forms of compensation continue to reduce the amount of
basic pay as a percentage of total compensation. A TSP and/or Roth IRA could become




Annual Asset Structure of State and Local Government Pension Funds as a Percentage of
Total Financial Assets, 1950-1995
Year Equity Bonds Cash Items Other
Assets
1950 1% 95% 2% 2%
1955 2% 94% 2% 3%
1960 3% 88% 1% 7%
1965 7% 81% 1% 11%
1970 17% 72% 1% 10%
1975 23% 68% 1% 7%
1976 25% 67% 1% 6%
1977 23% 70% 1% 6%
1978 22% 71% 2% 6%
1979 22% 70% 2% 6%
1980 23% 69% 2% 6%
1981 21% 70% 2% 6%'
1982 23% 68% 3% 6%
1983 29% 60% 4% 7%
1984 28% 61% 5% 6%
1985 30% 58% 6% 5%
1986 32% 57% 6% 5%
1987 32% 57% 6% 5%
1988 36% 52% 5% 7%
1989 39% 48% 4% 9%
1990 36% 48% 4% 12%
1991 44% 41% 5% 10%
1992 45% 38% 5% 12%
1993 47% 37% 5% 11%
1994 44% 37% 6% 13%
1995 51% 32% 4% 13%
Source: EBRI Databook on Employee Benefits, 1997.
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VI. FINANCIAL PLANNING PROGRAMS WITHIN THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
"There was a time when a fool and his money were soon parted, but now it
happens to everybody." Adlai Stevenson, 1966
Management of personal finances is presenting an increasing challenge to military
members and their families. For some, the lack of basic consumer skills and training in
managing individual finances results in financial difficulty. The escalating cost of living
in the United States and abroad, and the failure of military pay to stay abreast of prices
have been made worse by the prevalence of easy credit, high pressure sales tactics, clever
advertising techniques and undisciplined spending. In many cases, resultant financial
problems have had a serious negative impact on military members and their families, as
well as debilitating effects on unit readiness, morale, and retention. [Ref. 35, p. 1]
A. PROGRAMS AVAILABLE TO SERVICE MEMBERS
1. Personal Financial Management (PFM) Program
During the past decade, the Navy has seen a substantial increase in the number of
service people experiencing financial difficulties. Evidence indicates that military
personnel are experiencing significant debt, loss of credit and/or financial crises,
including bankruptcy, poor budget practices, and lack of basic money management skills.
[Ref. 36, p. iv] In August 1989, the Secretary of the Navy directed the Navy to
"develop" a comprehensive personal financial management program that met the needs
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of all DON members. In response to this important Quality of Life issue, the Navy
Personal Financial Management Education. Training, and Counseling Program was
implemented under OPNAVINST 1740.5 in November 1990. [Ref. 36, p. iv] The new-
program is commonly referred to as the Personal Financial Management (PFM) Program.
Similar programs were developed in the other branches of the Department of Defense.
[Ref. 40. p. 1]
The PFM program emphasizes personal financial responsibility and accountability
by providing basic principles and practices, sound money management, counseling tools
and referral services. Under the program, fundamental financial management principles
and skills are introduced to officers and enlisted personnel at accession points. These
skills are reinforced by Command Financial Specialists (CFS) at schools and command or
unit levels. [Ref. 35, p. 1]
The PFM program directive identifies the Command Financial Specialist as each
command's principle advisor on policies and matters related to PFM. The CFS are
considered the most important link in the program as they serve as the interface between
the service members in need and the program objectives. Each command is required to
have at least one CFS and may have more at the discretion of the commanding officer.
The PFM program sponsor is the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower,
Personnel, and Training) (OP-01). The Chief of Naval Personnel (PERS-00) through the
Director, Navy Personal Readiness and Community Support Division (PERS-6)
implements and coordinates the Navy PFM Program. [Ref. 36, Encl. 1]
CFS training is a five-day course conducted at designated Navy Family Service
Centers (NFCS) or by a Mobile Training Team (MTT). The purpose of the course is to
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provide the trainee with a basic understanding of financial management problems
encountered by service members and their families and to provide them with the
knowledge and skills to develop and implement financial training and counseling
programs at their commands. [Ref. 37. p. 1] The CFS must be an E-6 or above, be highly
motivated and financially stable. Also, they must complete a CFS training course
provided by designated Family Service Centers. At the completion of formal training,
the CFS shall be able to assist the command to establish, organize and administer the
command PFM Program and disseminate financial management information within their
command. Additionally, they maintain current PFM resource books, directories,
references and training materials and present PFM training as part of the command
General Military Training (GMT) program. Finally, Command Financial Specialists are
responsible for counseling individual members and referring members with serious
financial problems to appropriate agencies capable of providing assistance or counseling.
[Ref. 36, End. 1]
The PFM program desk guide includes a two-hour saving and investment
seminar. It provides an introduction to saving and investing, including goal-setting,
establishing savings, and the fundamentals of investing. It is suitable for all military
audiences and is regarded as the most motivating program in the CFS curriculum. The
savings and investment program deals with a specific area of financial management that
requires in-depth knowledge by the instructor. The objective of the seminar is to educate
and train participants in the basics of saving and investing so they can establish a goal-
oriented savings and investment program, or enhance plans already in place. The program
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does sufficiently address issues pertaining to long term savings, and traditional IRA and
mutual fund investing decisions. [Ref. 35, pp. 6-1-6-2]
The PFM desk guide recommends that instructors in the saving and investment
seminar have a full understanding of investment and savings programs and have specific
certifications in order to field questions from participants. The PFM desk guide
specifically states that CFS are not investment advisors and are strictly prohibited from
providing specific financial advice, making specific investment recommendations, or
referring individuals to commercial organizations. [Ref. 35, p. 6-2] The guide implies
that most Financial Specialists at the command or unit level are not experienced enough
or have adequate training to advise service members on long term saving and investment
decisions.
2. Transition Assistance for Military Personnel (TAMP)
The Transition Assistance for Military Personnel (TAMP) program was
developed in 1990 through a coordinated effort with the Department of Labor's
Transition Assistance Program (TAP) to help active duty military personnel transition
from the military to civilian lifestyle. It is a combined effort between the Departments of
Defense, Labor, and Veterans Affairs. An integral aspect of this program is ensuring that
separating members are made aware of and have access to the numerous programs and
services available to them in the transition process. [Ref. 38, pp. 1-2] Though this is a
beneficial program for members transitioning from active duty to civilian society, it does
not benefit young active duty members early in their careers with regards to financial
planning. Also, it does not provide counseling for retirement saving and investing
decisions. [Ref. 38, p. 2]
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3. Transition Planning for Military Personnel
Another program addressing financial advice for military personnel is provided by
the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) Work Force Programs Department.
AARP is the nation's leading organization for people age 50 and over. [Ref. 39. p. 2]
The program is designed to provide a four-day seminar for transitioning personnel. There
are approximately two and one-half hours of time allotted on day three of the seminar for
Personal Financial Planning. The time is used discussing the importance of finances as it
relates to the member's transition to civilian life. Time is spent looking at personal
financial planning, including saving and spending patterns and investment options. [Ref.
39, p. 64] Though AARP prefers to offer the seminar two years prior to retirement from
the military, most participants attend the program during their last three months on active
duty. [Ref. 39, p. 3]
B. MILITARY SUMMIT ON PERSONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
Personal Financial Management has become a critical subject in both DoD and
Congress. A report by the Senate Armed Services Committee, S.R. 105-340, included
initiatives to educate young members on personal financial management. [Ref. 42, p.
297] Also, service and DoD initiatives were briefed during the first Military Summit on
Personal Financial Management in December 1997. [Ref 40, p. 1]
A summit participant. Mr. Shawn Presson, indicated that DoD recognizes the
significance of personal finances in the lives of service members. Thousands of hours
and millions of dollars are spent dealing with these issues and much of the effort is
remedial. The results of personal financial management inadequacies are lowered
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productivity, lost-time, increased costs, stress related illness, security risks, and
employability problems. [Ref. 41, p. 4] According to Presson,
The DoD recognizes the significance of personal finances in the
lives of service members and has chosen a proactive approach using
multimedia for the following reasons. First, more personnel can be trained
than current resources will allow using traditional methods. Also,
multimedia is often superior to platform instruction in the DoD
environment because variation can be reduced via interactive courseware.
[Ref. 41. pp. 5-7].
PFM multimedia training is a multi-disc CD-ROM project sponsored by the
Office of Family Policy and co-developed by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense, Intec Multimedia, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University and 1 1 *
Day entertainment. [Ref 4 1 , p. 10] The CD-ROM contains ten lessons on personal
financial management. Lesson nine focuses on saving and investment by helping
students understand the concepts behind short, medium, and long-term investment
strategies. The lesson teaches the importance of starting early, goal setting, and
retirement/estate planning. It also teaches students how to calculate the time value of
money, evaluate risk, and develop a successful savings plan. [Ref. 41, p. 15]
C. RECENT ATTENTION TO PERSONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT IN
THE ARMED FORCES
The Senate Armed Services Committee has identified personal finance training as
an item of special interest, urging secretaries of the military departments to review^ the
adequacy of current programs. In their 1998 report, the committee makes reference to
checkbook management, credit card management, and debt management. The report also
states that committee members believe that command programs should make military
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members aware of the advantages of the Roth IRA. [Ref. 42, p. 297] It states that the
'"Roth IRA may offer significant advantage to military personnel since that IRA option is
more favorable to those in lower tax brackets and can be used for a variety of purposes.
In fact, for many service members the Roth IRA may be more beneficial than a 401 (k)
plan." [Ref 42, p. 297]
D. THE FUTURE OF PERSONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT IN THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Prior discussion in this thesis addressed the benefits of contributing to both
traditional and Roth IRAs. Also discussed were the advantages that military members
would derive from a Thrift Savings Plan similar to the FERS plan. Because options
under FERS include choosing between stocks, bonds, and treasury securities or a
combination of the three, a similar plan for military members would force them to choose
the investment vehicles appropriate for their long-term goals. It would be beneficial to
service members, especially junior personnel, to have some form of financial counseling
to advise them on their options, risks, and possible benefits from investing in a plan such
as FERS.
Examination of savings rates in the 1990's provided in Chapter V indicates a
declining trend in savings rates in the U. S. Also, prevalent in the 1990's is an increasing
trend in investments in defined contribution plans. Tax incentives in the form of greater
deferrals and deductions are making contributing to defined contribution plans even more
appealing. These trends signify that future retirement benefits will most likely depend on
the investment decisions that young people make early in their careers. Unless young
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members in the military are advised on the financial decisions available to them, they will
most likely not benefit from similar retirement investments that their civilian counterparts
will realize.
Retirement and saving plans in the private sector have proven successful for those
employees who participate. If military members are to enjoy financial success in
investment and savings decisions similar to that which civilian employees are
experiencing, a more extensive program than is now in place to help advise members
would seem beneficial.
The 1997 Military Summit on Financial Management emphasized the importance
of personal finance in the lives of sailors and soldiers and provided some ideas to
improve what is currently offered in the way of financial counseling. It appears that
multi-media training programs, like the one currently being developed for use at a
command level, would be beneficial for service members. However, because of the ever
changing environment associated with this subject, future updates would be required to
keep members up to date with new tax laws, investment opportunities, and long-term
predictions. It appears that some resources in the form of Family Service Centers and
Command Financial Specialists could be used to improve and expand systems already in




The objective of this thesis is to examine whether changes in the current Military
Compensation System could provide savings to the Department of Defense, while
providing military members the long-term security necessary to achieve force structure
requirements in the All-Volunteer Force. It examines the current military pay and
retirement systems and addresses issues including the perceived pay gap. the effects of
reduced retirement benefits under REDUX, and proposed legislation for a military thrift
savings plan. Additionally, it identifies current retirement saving plans being used in the
private sector in order to provide comparisons between future private sector and military
benefits. Finally, current personal financial management programs in the Department of
Defense were examined to determine if there exists sufficient information and adequate
human resources for counseling and advising service members if civilian style defined
contribution plans were introduced in the military.
The current military compensation system is a complex array of pay. allowances,
and benefits. Because of recent force reductions, a strong economy, and the basic
structure of the military compensation system, it is difficult to determine the long-term
effects of recent decreases in retirement benefits and perceived gaps in military pay on
recruiting and retention. Preliminary statements by military leaders have suggested that
the pay reductions are the cause of lower morale, unusually low retention, and increased
problems in meeting recruiting goals. In a recent interview, Kenneth H. Bacon, Assistant
Secretary of Defense Public Affairs Officer, stated that the Secretary of Defense is
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particularly worried about whether changes in the military retirement system in 1986 are
having a corrosive effect on retention today. [Ref. 43, p. 5]
B. MILITARY PAY ISSUES
Studies, such as the one conducted by RAND (DECI), illustrate that a gap only
exists among some groups within the military. Still other critics have concluded that
there is no gap. citing evidence suggesting that after substantial pay raises to military pay
in the 1980s, members of the services should have been better off then their civilian
counterparts. Others believe that civilian equivalency rates, like those used in the Navy
Working Capital Fund, should be used as comparison for wages between military and
civilian. However, using civilian equivalency rates would be inaccurate because these
rates are based on what individual members cost each command. Civilian equivalency
rates include such items as training, travel, and moving costs. They do not represent
actual dollar amounts that individual members receive for performing work. Therefore,
civilian equivalency rates should not be used to compare military and civilian salaries.
After careful study it appears that trends in military compensation have begun to erode
the value of basic pay, resulting in a persistent gap between military and civilian pay.
1. Comparing Military and Civilian Pay
Differences in structure between military and private sector pay illustrate that
under the current system of compensation, the current index used (the ECI) to compare
military pay to civilian pay is not accurate because it accounts for only some portions of
military compensation. It does not include special pays, bonuses, incentives, and certain
allowances. The problem in using the ECI is that not all military personnel receive such
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"extra payments". Therefore, one must conclude that the only way to fairly compare
military and civilian pay would be to simplify the current compensation and benefits
system in the military.
The recent trend in providing bonuses or incentive pay to certain groups within
the military in an effort to provide pay comparable to civilian counterparts undermines
the principle of paying members according to rank. This policy seems to result in long-
term retention problems in other groups or communities where individuals feel that their
talents and expertise are not appreciated or rewarded. This can lead to long-term
retention problems in a hierarchical system relying on an awards system based on rank,
performance, and time in service. If policymakers feel that a military compensation
system based on job description, community grouping, or technical expertise would be
less costly and provide a more stable force, then the current system based on rank and
time in service would have to be abandoned. Otherwise, it is apparent that the current
compensation system should be revised to more closely reflect the principles on which
the system was founded.
2. Reducing Bonus and Incentive Pay
One logical change to the current system would involve decreasing the resources
applied to special pays, bonuses, incentives and allowances, and increasing basic pay
such that basic pay accounts for almost all of active duty military compensation costs. If
the current system of bonuses and incentives were reduced or eliminated it would provide
an additional source to fund increases in basic pay and/or military retirement fund accrual
charges.
n:
Based on figures provided in the Department of the Navy Biennial Budget
Estimates, basic pay could be increased by more than 1 percent by eliminating the
current system of bonuses and incentives and using those resources to fund increases in
basic pay. [Ref. 13. p. 13] Leaders and politicians are reluctant to do this because it
would result in higher costs for military retirement. They would also argue that it would
have a detrimental effect on retention because service members currently receiving large
bonuses, special pays, and incentives may choose to leave the service.
However, it would provide greater incentive for those not currently receiving
bonuses or incentives to remain in the service. Members may remain in the service
whether compensation is in the form of basic pay or bonuses and incentives as long as the
compensation is comparable to what could be made elsewhere. In fact, raises in basic
pay would be more beneficial for service members because they would increase future
retirement benefits. If compensation is not comparable individuals will be more likely to
look for other employment.
3. Long Term Effects
a. The Diminishing Value ofBasic Pay
The military pay system should be viewed in the manner that Senge uses
in describing systems within organizations. He implies that one of the characteristics
within any system, including the military pay system, is that the system grows for a
period and then encounters problems that require changes or fixes to the system. "Many
systems get locked in runaway vicious spirals where every actor has to run faster and
faster to stay in the same place. Still others lure individual actors into doing what seems
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right locally, yet which eventually causes suffering for all." [Ref. 44, p. 17] This is
particularly evident with regard to the current system of incentives and bonuses.
Beginning as a simple system to retain and recruit a small fraction of personnel,
bonuses and incentives are now being used to lure more than half of the active duty force.
The system archetype that would best fit such a system would be "Shifting the Burden."
It is when a short-term solution is used to correct a problem, with seemingly happy
immediate results. As this correction is used more and more, fundamental long-term
corrective measures are used less. "Over time, the mechanism of the fundamental
solution may atrophy or become disabled, leading to even greater reliance on the
symptomatic solution." [Ref. 43, p. 17]
It appears that policymakers are relying more and more on bonuses to attract and
retain personnel. For example, the FY 199S Navy budget estimates include provisions
for an enlistment bonus to attract high quality personnel who might otherwise find greater
financial rewards in the civilian marketplace. Also, the budget estimates contend that the
selective reenlistment bonus continues to remain the most cost effective method of
retaining top notch, technically trained personnel in critically manned billets to meet
mission requirements. Many of these positions, including nuclear propulsion technicians,
medical technician specialists, advanced electronic computer specialists, and foreign
language specialists, are in demand in the civilian sector. [Ref. 13, p. 4] Policymakers
assert that adequate reenlistment incentives are required to counter the potential loss of
talent and expertise.
It is apparent that efforts at improving recruiting and retention have been focused
on providing bonus and incentives to personnel. Though this has proven an effective
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measure in the past, it poses significant risks to the fundamental structure of military
compensation. Designed to be a short term solution to retention and recruiting problems
in a particular community or rating, the long-term use of bonus and incentives continues
to diminish the effect of basic pay as a retention and recruiting tool.
In fact, the Navy biennial budget for FY 1 998 estimates that basic pay will
constitute only 66 percent of total military compensation. [Ref. 13 p. 13] In FY 1991
basic pay costs made up 75 percent of active duty compensation. [Ref. 3, p. 179] This is
quite a contrast considering that at one time the military relied on basic pay as the sole
source of cash compensation for members. Also, because retirement benefits are
calculated as a percentage of each member's basic pay, the lure of retirement is reduced
by the diminishing value of base pay in total compensation. One could argue that while it
appears that bonuses and incentives represent low cost tools for meeting retention goals,
their long-term success is more than offset by the loss to the services of personnel leaving
as a consequence of the diminishing value of basic pay.
b. Long Term Inequality Effects Among Ratings or Communities
It could be argued that although bonuses or incentives in one rating or
community help to maintain or increase retention levels, they also hinder retention in
other ratings or communities because those members look at the bonus or incentive as an
inequality. In a system based on the fundamentals of equality, fairness, and responsibility
levels the current system of bonuses and incentives weakens the compensation for work
performed, hours worked, and responsibility level. In fact, it results in a system where it
is possible for a lower ranking individual to actually earn more compensation than
someone more senior. It seems appropriate that policymakers could consider bonuses for
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achievement of a certain rank or promotion or as an award for superior performance. But
bonuses as incentive to remain in the service only undermine the incentive of basic pay
and military retirement as the core compensation vehicle.
4. Basic Pay Raises
Where it is logical that basic pay should be the major tool to manage force
structure, over the years there has been increasing emphasis on using military retirement,
bonuses and incentives, and special pays for that reason. This creates a particular
problem in that when a problem in recruiting or retention is encountered it may take long
periods of time to determine which of the force structure tools caused it and which one
should be used to correct it. One could argue that this lag in identifying causes for
retention or recruiting problems only results in additional costs in the form of training
new personnel to meet personnel shortfalls. Also, it forces the services to apply more
personnel and financial resources to try and attract quality people. Arguably, those
people and resources could be better used in operating units, procurement of new
systems, or to fund raises in compensation to retain highly trained individuals already on
active duty.
Another consideration for current compensation policy is the cost of managing all
of the different pays, allowances, and compensation programs. For example, each
different category of compensation requires budget and administrative personnel. A
simpler system would reduce the cost of such personnel.
Examination of the current basic pay structure demonstrates that perhaps future
pay raises could be skewed to provide greater incentive for performance and promotion.
The percentage increases in pay should provide greater incentive for personnel to aspire
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to higher rank and responsibility. For example, the pay raise to 0-3 should not be a
greater increase than the raise to 0-4. Also, if the DECI study by RAND is accurate in
concluding that some pay grades within the military are actually compensated more than
their civilian counterparts, it may not be necessary to raise the pay levels in those pay
grades since they would be less likely to be able to find greater opportunities in the
private sector. Specifically, junior and senior enlisted males are identified as groups that
should not require raises equal to other groups.
5. Cost of Closing the Pay Gap
A recent article in the Newport News Daily Press, estimates that the cost to close
the current pay gap over the five-year defense plan would be over $3 1 billion. During a
recent visit with operating forces, Secretary of Defense Cohen heard repeated complaints
about pay and compensation issues. His staff is reviewing what proposals might be made
in the fiscal year 2000 budget for better compensation. Service officials are urging the
Secretary to ask for an increase in the ceiling for defense spending. [Ref. 52, p. 6]
C. MILITARY RETIREMENT ISSUES
1. The Military Retirement Fund
The accrual funding model as a vehicle to fund the Military Retirement Fund
coincided with the introduction of REDUX for current active-duty military personnel
entering after June 30, 1986. This has created a perception among today's forces that
they have been called on to bear the brunt of past and future generations of military
retirees. Under the military personnel system the accrual funding method requires that
payments be made to the Military Retirement Fund (MRF) out of personnel funding
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dollars from the four services based on a normal cost percentage. It could be argued that
the normal cost of funding military retirement has decreased due to the recent draw-
down. In fact, conservative economic assumptions made by the Board of Actuaries are a
more likely the reason for decreases to the normal cost. [Ref. 14, pp. 12-16] Because the
normal cost is paid from military personnel accounts, it seems appropriate that any gains
to the MRF from the normal cost amount be realized by the military personnel accounts.
Instead only the Treasury benefits from any such gains.
Despite the added requirement in 1986 to fund MRF, it appears that insufficient
additional funding to the military personnel account resulted. Insofar as budgeting for
military personnel is a "zero sum game," funding sources for the MRF have to come from
other military appropriation accounts, perhaps including the military personnel accounts.
In light of this, it could be perceived that some portion ofMRF funding has been
provided from dollars that in the past had been used for annual pay raises or retirement
benefits under High-3 or Final Pay. It appears that cuts to military retirement in 1986
may have partially resulted from legislative action in 1 984 to require DoD to fund
military retirement through the MRF. It was through the accrual based method of
funding retirement that the true costs of military retirement were made clear. DoD does
not realize gains on any portion of normal cost contributions. If budgeting for military
personnel is a "zero sum game," then it is accurate to conclude that to some degree men
and women in uniform today have been indirectly funding the MRF, either through
decreased future retirement benefits or insufficient pay raises since the fund was
mandated in 1986.
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2. REDUX and the Future Outlook of Military Retirement Benefits
Preliminary evidence, provided by Rep. Steven Buyer and The Retired Officer's
Association, suggests that the results ofREDUX are decreased retention among first time
enlistees and junior officers. For example, Admiral Bowman, director of nuclear
reactors, recently addressed the recruiting shortfall by stating that the problem must soon
be fixed before it becomes a crisis. Otherwise he said " we will be facing a death spiral
with respect to nuclear manning, heading for a return to the extended at-sea tours we saw
in the late 70's. " [Ref. 46, p. 8]
Evidence in recent RAND studies on compensation and force structure suggests
that the reason for reductions in retirement spending under REDUX is that the current
system was too costly. [Ref. 3, p. 1 76] But it seems premature to reach this conclusion
without first studying the effects on force structure of the savings achieved by REDUX.
For example, if such savings result in a less capable and qualified force, policymakers
will have to decide if cost saving measures are appropriate and beneficial for national
security. It would be more beneficial to study whether the same quality of force could be
obtained at reduced cost.
Also, the RAND study suggests that REDUX provides a much stronger incentive
to remain in the service beyond the 20-year point. Specifically "an analysis in Asch and
Warner (1993) indicates that the post-twenty year retention rates will rise substantially."
[Ref. 3, p. 196] Although substantiating evidence will not be available until after 2006.
in a strong economy such as is being experienced in the mid-1990's, more individuals
may be inclined to leave the service after 10 or more years of service because of
promising job opportunities in the private sector.
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Though REDUX was intended to increase incentives for individuals to remain on
active duty for a 30-year career, recent retention trends and statements by law-makers,
senior military leaders, and military advocates indicate that it has provided greater
incentive for personnel to leave the service after their first enlistment. It appears that
while REDUX has succeeded at providing a less costly system of retirement, at the same
time it has discouraged individuals from serving a full career.
3. Costs of Restoring the Fifty Percent Retirement System
Many senior military leaders and advocates insist that restoring the 50 percent
retirement plan to members under REDUX may not be feasible or the right thing to do.
They argue that moving a million REDUX members to the High-3 plan would cost more
than $9.3 billion over the 5-year defense plan. General Shelton has stated that with
defense budgets capped at $250 billion a year under the balanced-budget agreement
between the President and Congress, finding extra dollars for compensation would be
tough. Rudy de Leon, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel, favors giving full cost-
of-living adjustments rather than capping COLAs at a percentage point below inflation.
The services would prefer raising the REDUX annuity formula so that a 20-year retiree
gets 50 percent. They believe such a change would be more visible and provide greater
retention incentive. [Ref. 52, p. 6]
D. RECRUITING AND RETENTION ISSUES
In June 1998 Navy Secretary John Dalton was told by the Navy's career
counselors that they are having an ever tougher time selling the Navy to individuals
already in uniform. The Secretary responded that pay and retirement benefits were not
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likely to improve much in the near future. His remarks came as the Navy has increased
recruiting efforts by spending an additional $15 million on television ads and adding 750
recruiters to the 3.800 it already has. [Ref. 45, p.20]
Assuming that the additional recruiters are in the rank of E-6 or above, the cost of
the additional recruiters basic pay alone is over $17.5 million. Housing costs and other
allowances would drive this amount considerably higher. Because basic pay, on average,
only constitutes 66 percent of total compensation, the additional personnel costs would
most likely be greater than $25 million. These actions have the appearance of another
short-term fix to a long-term problem. Some individuals refer to such solutions as
'"BandAid" fixes. What it fails to address is that there will come a time shortly after
individuals are recruited and trained when more resources will be needed to keep them in
(i.e., a retention bonus). Though bonuses and incentives seem to be more cost effective
in that their use does not result in increased retirement benefits, there appears to be
contradicting evidence as to the effectiveness of bonuses and incentives as retention
tools.
For example, the head of the Navy's nuclear programs. Admiral Skip Bowman,
says his community is facing dangerous shortages. According to Navy Times the Navy is
short 18,000 sailors or 5.5 percent of the 328,000 enlisted people it needs and recruiters
have not met monthly recruiting quotas since September 1997. [Ref. 46, p. 8] Other
communities continue to claim similar problems. More generous bonuses are being
sought by those communities to lure individuals to remain in the service.
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1. Enlisted
It is estimated that the Navy will miss recruiting goals by 6,300 in 1998.
Apparently the reasons for below average recruiting numbers have been forewarned for
years. Admiral Barbara McGann, who heads the Navy's recruiting force, stresses that
young people are more apt to choose college over a military enlistment. Other reasons
include that young people today do not look to the military to start their working lives.
Also, young people are not influenced by adults to join the services because fewer and
fewer adults have military backgrounds. Finally, potential recruits do not want to commit
to the four or six years of service required for most training. [Ref. 46, p. 8]
The one area not discussed by the Admiral is the effect that perceived decreases in
military compensation and benefits are having on recruiting shortfalls. While there are as
yet insufficient data to support such reasons, senior military leaders such as the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs, General Shelton, believe there is sufficient anecdotal evidence that
compensation is impacting retention. [Ref. 52, p. 5]
2. Officers
Though it is apparent that the military is recruiting enough officers to fill first tour
billets, retention of those officers appears to be of increasing concern. For example,
average department head tours for surface warfare officers are being increased to on
average 44 months, up from the traditional 36-month tours. Though leaders have been
reluctant to admit that there are retention problems, the increased length of sea tours
indicates insufficient numbers in the surface community to meet the demand every three
years. To ease retention problems and prevent future decreases in morale, the surface
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community has requested career incentive bonuses similar to those used in the aviation
and nuclear communities. [Ref. 47]
3. Recent Trends Affecting Retention Decisions
a. Demographics, Quality ofLife, Compensation, and Military Life
Today's service members and families are quite different from past
members with respect to demographics. More than 55 percent of service members on
active duty in 1 998 are married and 70 percent of member spouses work. With families
comes increased financial responsibility. Also, in the era of the All-Volunteer Force
there is much competition between the military and the private sector for quality
personnel. Retention of quality personnel can be directly related to service members'
perception and satisfaction with the quality of life in the military. The military lifestyle
can create special and unique financial concerns such as frequent moves, extended
separations from families, fluctuations in pay, and retirement concerns. Financial
problems are a leading cause of personal stress and family dysfunction in all military
branches. [Ref. 36, p. A-l]
b. The Wage Penalty
A study presented at the Military Summit on Personal Financial
Management in DoD in 1 997, found that over the course of a military career, the wage
penalty incurred by spouses of military personnel ranges from 13 to 34 percent less than
expected earnings of civilian contemporaries. [Ref. 48, p. 1 7] This is attributed to
frequent moves, which inhibit spouses from receiving benefits associated with working
for a single employer for long periods of time. Lost benefits include little or no vesting in
employer retirement programs, longevity pay raises, and/or healthcare benefits. The
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study included 32, 847 civilian spouses of military personnel and compared them with
790,977 civilian DoD employees not married to military personnel. [Ref. 48, p. 1 ] The
study concluded that a wage penalty exists among DoD civilian employees who are
spouses of military members. The study considered this as a major reason for protecting
military retirement as a deferred compensation for military families. [Ref. 48, p. 26]
c. Vesting
In Chapter III, graduated vesting is examined for service members with
fewer than 20 years of service. It suggests that such vesting for military members has not
been implemented because the services do not believe that it provides enough flexibility
in managing the force. Similarly, the Military Summit on Personal Financial
Management addressed the impact of adopting a retirement system which vests before 20
years of service. It concluded that vesting before 20 years of service would negatively
impact recruiting and retaining well-educated enlisted and officers. It based its
conclusion on three interrelated factors. First, well educated service members are married
to well educated spouses. Also, the civil sector exhibits a rising wage premium for
education. Finally, household income has become an important metric of household
welfare as the number of two income families has risen. The study predicted that these
factors may cause more mid-careerists to leave the service, especially if the individual is
already guaranteed to receive some vested benefits. . [Ref. 48, p.21]
4. Retirement as a Retention Tool
Recent trends in recruiting and retention, competition from the private-sector, and
the problems outlined in Chapters I through III, offer evidence that the current
(U£ compensation system requires reengineering. Radical or fundamental process redesigns
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such as eliminating bonuses, increasing retirement benefits through TSPs or IRAs. and
increasing basic pay to close current pay gaps are only part of the overall problem facing
the system.
Although there are different proposals with regard to the type of defined
contribution plan that could be offered to military personnel, the economic success and
popularity of equity investments in the past decade has proven that some kind of plan
would be beneficial to people in uniform. Evidence suggests that recent trends in private
sector retirement plans have placed greater emphasis on defined contribution plans. Also,
law-makers are providing additional tax incentives to employees who participate in those
plans.
It is likely that future laws will continue to provide incentive for individuals to
save for retirement through defined contribution plans. It is possible that the earnings in
defined contribution plans will have even greater impact on the economy as baby
boomers begin to reach retirement age. While military retirement benefits have been
regarded as generous when compared with other defined benefit plans in the past, the
future returns in defined contribution plans are likely to provide much greater financial
>A[ security than defined benefit plans. Analysis in Chapter V of the FERS TSP clearly
indicates that participating federal employees will be better off at age 60 then the
majority of military personnel who serve twenty years on active duty, disregarding post-
retirement earnings. This is especially true for those military members who entered the
military after REDUX was introduced in 1986.
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5. Civilian Style Plans Undermine Military Retirement Justification
Critics of adopting private style retirement plans for the military claim that such
systems undermine military retirement justification. They fail to acknowledge that
military retirement is justified by how individuals serving on active duty today view the
current system and whether those individuals feel they will be better off in the future with
a private sector retirement plan or with benefits provided from the military's defined
benefit plan. In short, the success of military compensation can only be measured by the
number of individuals who remain on active duty.
It appears that the decreased value of future benefits under REDUX, as illustrated H/
in the net present value comparison in chapter four, is causing more individuals to forego
future military retirement benefits and seek greater returns and security in private
industry or other federal or local government employment. We will not know ifREDUX
will achieve its goal of increased retention for members at the 20 plus career point until
after 2006. However, it appears that unless benefits of the 50 percent retirement system Jk
are restored or alternative benefits such as a thrift savings plan are offered, the military
will find it difficult to retain quality people in sufficient numbers in the 21 st century.
The proposed thrift savings plan for military members would be one incentive for
military members to stay for a full career. However, the proposed system with no
matching funds, would not be nearly as generous as the TSP under FERS. Also, without
matching funds there would be less incentive, especially for junior personnel, to
contribute to such a plan. Because junior personnel are for the most part limited by
income and would be able to do as well or better in a Roth or traditional IRA, it is likely
that many would not contribute to a TSP plan without matching contribution.^Analysis
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presented in Chapter V illustrates that a system of skewed matching contribution would
be less costly than the FERS TSP, but would still provide additional incentive for all
service members to participate. Because the defined benefit plan in the military is
somewhat more generous than the FERS plan, a TSP with matching funds less than
FERS seems reasonable and justifiable. ^
6. More Attention to Retention and Recruiting Issues From Lawmakers
Issues concerning better pay and retirement benefits for military personnel have
begun to attract more influential lawmakers. A September 1998 Army Times article
identifies four items that Sen. Trent Lott, the Senate majority leader, has listed as areas
that deserve closer attention. Among them are closing the military pay gap, returning to
one retirement system that provides retired pay equal to 50 percent of basic pay for 20
years of service, and adopting a thrift savings plan similar to FERS for military
personnel. Lott, whose position makes him the most influential member of the Senate,
said he is concerned that reduced budgets and more missions are leading to overworked
people and worn out equipment. He wrote in a letter to the chairmen of the Senate
Armed Services Committee and the Senate Appropriations Committee that
In an All-Volunteer Force, people choose to enter and whether or
not to remain in the military. Today, this country is not attracting and
retaining enough people of the kinds needed to staff an increasingly higher
skilled force, even though the force size is smaller today than it was before
World War II. [Ref. 49, p. 1]
In the August 12, 1998 letter to Senator Stevens, Senator Lott said.
I am increasingly concerned that our military has begun a
downward spiral that, if left unchecked will lead to a weakened military
no longer able to underwrite our interests. This spiral results from fewer
and fewer military people and less equipment and supplies, being called to
do more and more around the world. This in turn, causes more wear and
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tear on people and equipment, which in turn results in fewer people and
less equipment. [Ref. 50, p.l]
The Senator went on to say that '"we need to get the missions, manpower, V
pay and benefits synchronized to enable us to continue with a quality force in the
21
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century." [Ref. 50, p.l] Among the most important areas requiring attention
he included: closing the pay gap, returning to the 50 percent retirement system,
and offering military personnel a 401(k) style plan similar to FERS." [Ref. 50,
P-l]
E. THE FUTURE OF MILITARY COMPENSATION AND RETIREMENT
The federal government is better equipped then it has ever been to analyze
compensation issues. An enormous amount of information on retirement plans has been
developed in various agencies that have some role in overseeing private pensions. One
might expect that possible solutions would be developed, consequences measured, and
legislative proposals made on how best to assure old-age income security for tomorrow's
retirees. But long-term issues such as retirement income policy are given short shrift by a
government seemingly transfixed by issues of current tax revenues and decreased
operating budgets. However, military leaders and congressional advocates have recently-
addressed reform packages that may provide members in the military with some of the
same retirement opportunities now enjoyed by non-military retirees.
In summary, the military compensation system has been significantly
compromised. It appears the incentive to remain in the military has been reduced by-
diminishing the value of basic pay when compared with private sector and other public
organizations. Also, decreases in retirement benefits for 20-year retirees under REDUX
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*may be causing larger numbers of active duty personnel to forego a full career in the
v^ military. Civilian style retirement plans such as the FERS TSP offer evidence that a
similar benefit offered to military personnel would most likely provide additional
incentive for individuals to remain on active duty for a full career.
Compensation policies such as skewed pay raises, skewed matching funds for
employee contributions to a defined contribution plan, and/or employer sponsored IRAs
are some examples ofhow policy makers could provide incentive for full military
careers. Also, such changes would be less costly than closing the perceived gap with
across the board pay raises or restoring the 50 percent retirement system to all active duty
members. Although this thesis attempted to find ways in which compensation costs for
personnel could be reduced, it seems apparent that in a strong economy, additional cuts in
personnel compensation would only exacerbate the current retention and recruiting
problems in the services.
Finally, it appears that greater emphasis on personal financial management within
the services would benefit military members in savings and retirement planning.
Counseling on the future benefits of contributing to a Roth IRA would be extremely
beneficial. Because the deadline to convert to the Roth IRA and defer taxes over the next
four years is December 31, 1998, such measures would need to take place quickly. Also,
as discussed at the Military Summit on Personal Financial Management, multi-media
training presents a means for consistent and informative education on saving and
investment decision making.
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F. RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES
This thesis presents some of the problems faced by the Department of Defense
with regard to compensation issues for service members. In an era of shrinking defense
budgets, a strong economy, and increasing demands on effectiveness and efficiency,
military compensation promises to play an important role in defining the quality and
number of personnel deciding to serve a full career. Further studies on retention,
specifically the quality of personnel being retained, would be helpful in determining
whether the military' compensation system is effective. Studies aimed at comparing the
quality of personnel staying in the service would seem beneficial in an organization
focused on being more effective and efficient.
Also, the full effects ofREDUX will not be known until after 2006. However,
recent evidence suggests the new system is impacting retention and recruiting. More
important than the sheer numbers of people is the effect that such reductions are having
on the quality of the force. [Ref 3, p. 182]
Though it appears military leaders and lawmakers have begun to address financial
management planning and training programs for military members, more resources and
research are necessary. Studies aimed at providing more comprehensive financial training




Estimated Annual Retirement Benefits for an 0-5 and E-7 Under Each Plan
Source
1998
Retirement Plans: 40% vs. 50%, Retired Officers Association, Navy Times, April 27,
0-5 E-7
Age Final Pay High 3 REDUX Age Final Pay High 3 REDUX
42 29,734 27,226 21,780 39 13,975 13,131 10.505
43 30,775 28,178 22,325 40 14,464 13,591 10.767
44 31.852 29,165 22,883 41 14.971 14.066 11,037
45 32,967 30,186 23,455 42 15,495 14,559 11,313
46 34,121 31,242 24,042 43 16,037 15,068 11,595
47 35,315 32,335 24,643 44 16,598 15.596 11.885
48 36.551 33,467 25,259 45 17,179 16.141 12.182
49 37.830 34,639 25.890 46 17,780 16.706 12.487
50 39.154 35,851 26.537 47 18,403 17,291 12,799
51 40.525 37,106 27,201 48 19,047 17,896 13.119
52 41,943 38,404 27,881 49 19.713 18,523 13,447
53 43,411 39,749 28.578 50 20,403 19,171 13.783
54 44,930 41,140 29,292 51 21,117 19,842 14,128
55 46,503 42,580 30.025 52 21,857 20,536 14.481
56 48,131 44.070 30.775 53 22,622 21,255 14.843
57 49,815 45.612 31,545 54 23.413 21.999 15.214
58 51,559 47,209 32,333 55 24,233 22.769 15,594
59 53,363 48,861 33,142 56 25.081 23,566 15,984
60 55,231 50,571 33,970 57 25,959 24,391 16,384
61 57,164 52,341 34,819 58 26,867 25,244 16.794
62 59,165 54,173 54,173 59 27,808 26,128 17.213
63 61,236 56,069 55,528 60 28,781 27,042 17,644
64 63,379 58,032 56,916 61 29,788 27,989 18,085
65 65,597 60,063 58,339 62 30,831 28,968 28,968
66 67,893 62,165 59,797 63 31,910 29.982 29.693
67 70,269 64,341 61,292 64 33,027 31.032 30.435
68 72,729 66,593 62,824 65 34,183 32,118 31,196
69 75,274 68,923 64,395 66 35,379 33,242 31,976
70 77,909 71,336 66,005 67 36,617 34,405 32.775
71 80,636 73,833 67,655 68 37,899 35,610 33,595
72 83,458 76,417 69,346 69 39,226 36,856 34,434
73 86,379 79,091 71,080 70 40,598 38,146 35.295
74 89,402 81,859 72,857 71 42,019 39,481 36,178
75 92,531 84,724 74,678 72 43,490 40,863 37.082
76 95.770 87,690 76,545 73 45,012 42,293 38.009
77 99,122 90,759 78,459 74 46,588 43,773 38.959
78 102,591 93,936 80,420 75 48.218 45,305 39,933
79 106,182 97,223 82.431 76 49.906 46.891 40.932
80 109,898 100.626 84,492
Total 2,514,035 2.301,932 1,940,211 Total 1.076.494 1.011,466 840.744




U.S. Personal Saving Rates as a Percentage of Disposable Income












































































































































Department of the Navy Average Basic Pay Costs and Proposed TSP Contribution Rates




Admiral $113,614.71 1 $113,614.71 5% $5,680.74
Admiral $113,614.71 9 $1,022,532.39 5% $5,680.74
Vice Admiral $109,638.57 29 $3,179,518.53 5% $5,481.93
Rear Admiral(UH) $99,332.56 77 $7,648,607.12 5% $4,966.63
Rear Admiral (LH) $87,599.71 100 $8,759,971.00 5% $4,379.99
Captain $73,553.33 3094 $227,574,003.02 5% $3,677.67
Commander $58,499.25 6644 $388,669,017.00 5% $2,924.96
Lieutenant $47,635.20 10732 $511,220,966.40 5% $2,381.76
Commander
Lieutenant $39,580.20 19569 $774,544,933.80 5% $1,979.01
Lieutenant JG $32,164.97 6292 $202,381,991.24 5% $1,608.25
Ensign $24,280.46 6500 $157,822,990.00 5% $1,214.02
Warrant Off W-4 $47,271.78 308 $14,559,708.24 5% $2,363.59
Warrant Off W-3 $38,934.54 785 $30,563,613.90 5% $1,946.73
Warrant Off W-2 $33,001.49 635 $20,955,946.15 5% $1,650.07
Sum $2,349,017,413.50




E-9 $39,849.57 3111 $123,972,012.27 5% $1,992.48
E-8 $32,430.85 7411 $240,345,029.35 5% $1,621.54
E-7 $27,544.71 24918 $686,359,083.78 5% $1,377.24
E-6 $23,397.24 58083 $1,358,981,890.92 5% $1,169.86
E-5 $19,160.37 72658 $1,392,154,163.46 5% $958.02
E-4 $15,737.06 67358 $1,060,016,887.48 5% $786.85
E-3 $13,416.36 45715 $613,328,897.40 5% $670.82
E-2 $12,400.39 27341 $339,039,062.99 5% $620.02
E-l $10,698.98 24935 $266,779,066.30 5% $534.95
Sum $6,080,976,093.95




Future Basic Pay Rates by Rank Assuming 3 Percent COLA
Year Ensign Lieutenant Junior Lieutenant Lieutenant Commander
Grade Commander
$24,280.46 $32,164.97 $39,580.20 $47,635.20 $58,499.25
;I $25,008.87 $33,129.92 $40,767.61 $49,064.26 $60,254.23
;I $25,759.14 $34,123.82 $41,990.63 $50,536.18 $62,061.85
i\ $26,531.91 $35,147.53 $43,250.35 $52,052.27 $63,923.71
t
5 $27,327.87 $36,201.96 $44,547.86 $53,613.84 $65,841.42
(\ $28,147.71 $37,288.02 $45,884.30 $55,222.25 $67,816.66
'
7 $28,992.14 $38,406.66 $47,260.83 $56,878.92 $69,851.16
i5 $29,861.90 $39,558.86 $48,678.65 $58,585.29 $71,946.70
c
) $30,757.76 $40,745.62 $50,139.01 $60,342.85 $74,105.10
i() $31,680.49 $41,967.99 $51,643.18 $62,153.13 $76,328.25
n $32,630.91 $43,227.03 $53,192.48 $64,017.73 $78,618.10
\:\ $33,609.84 $44,523.84 $54,788.25 $65,938.26 $80,976.64
13 $34,618.13 $45,859.56 $56,431.90 $67,916.40 $83,405.94
\4 \ $35,656.67 $47,235.34 $58,124.86 $69,953.90 $85,908.12
If $36,726.37 $48,652.40 $59,868.60 $72,052.51 $88,485.36
16 i $37,828.17 $50,111.98 $61,664.66 $74,214.09 $91,139.93
1*
' $38,963.01 $51,615.33 $63,514.60 $76,440.51 $93,874.12
18, $40,131.90 $53,163.79 $65,420.04 $78,733.73 $96,690.35
19 $41,335.86 $54,758.71 $67,382.64 $81,095.74 $99,591.06
20 $42,575.93 $56,401.47 $69,404.12 $83,528.61 $102,578.79
Year 1E-l E-2 E-3 E-4 E-5 E-6 E-7
1 $10,698.98 $12,400.39 $13,416.36 $15,737.06 $19,160.37 $23,397.24 $7,544.71
2 $11,019.95 $12,772.40 $13,818.85 $16,209.17 $19,735.18 $24,099.16 $8,371.05
3 $11,350.55 $13,155.57 $14,233.42 $16,695.45 $20,327.24 $24,822.13 $29,222.18
4 $11,691.06 $13,550.24 $14,660.42 $17,196.31 $20,937.05 $25,566.80 $30,098.85
5 $12,041.80 $13,956.75 $15,100.23 $17,712.20 $21,565.17 $26,333.80 $31,001.81
6 $12,403.05 $14,375.45 $15,553.24 $18,243.57 $22,212.12 $27,123.81 $31,931.87
7 $12,775.14 $14,806.71 $16,019.84 $18,790.87 $22,878.48 $27,937.53 $32,889.82
8 $13,158.40 $15,250.92 $16,500.43 $19,354.60 $23,564.84 $28,775.65 $33,876.52
9 $13,553.15 $15,708.44 $16,995.44 $19,935.24 $24,271.78 $29,638.92 $34,892.81
10 $13,959.74 $16,179.70 $17,505.31 $20,533.29 $24,999.94 $30,528.09 $35,939.60
11 $14,378.53 $16,665.09 $18,030.47 $21,149.29 $25,749.94 $31,443.93 $37,017.79
12 $14,809.89 $17,165.04 $18,571.38 $21,783.77 $26,522.43 $32,387.25 $38,128.32
13 $15,254.19 $17,679.99 $19,128.52 $22,437.28 $27,318.11 $33,358.87 $39,272.17
14 $15,711.81 $18,210.39 $19,702.38 $23,110.40 $28,137.65 $34,359.64 $40,450.34
15 $16,183.17 $18,756.70 $20,293.45 $23,803.72 $28,981.78 $35,390.42 $41,663.85
16 $16,668.66 $19,319.40 $20,902.25 $24,517.83 $29,851.23 $36,452.14 $42,913.76
17 $17,168.72 $19,898.99 $21,529.32 $25,253.36 $30,746.77 $37,545.70 $44,201.17
18 $17,683.78 $20,495.96 $22,175.20 $26,010.96 $31,669.17 $38,672.07 $45,527.21
19 $18,214.30 $21,110.83 '$22,840.45 $26,791.29 $32,619.25 $39,832.23 $46,893.02




Department of the Navy Average Age by Rank
Rank Average Age Rank Average Age
O-l 23.2 E-l 19.4
0-2 26.4 E-2 18.3
0-3 29.0 E-3 20.1
0-4 34.6 E-4 22.1
0-5 39.2 E-5 25.3
0-6 44.0 E-6 29.5
0-7 49.0 E-7 32.6
0-8 51.7 E-8 35.8
0-9 51.7 E-9 38.8
O-10 53.0
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